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1 . In t r o d u c t io n
Our democracy provides a legal system that enables judicial involvement in the 
event of a disagreement and a final determination of the rights of the parties is 
usually embodied in the form of a judgment. Creditors often believe that once a 
judgment is obtained, the judgment debtor will in turn pay the debt. The reality is far 
different. A judgment from the court does not guarantee that the judgment creditor 
will be fully, or even partially, reimbursed. Unfortunately, a money judgment rarely 
results in its immediate execution, thus forcing the plaintiff to undertake additional 
proceedings to overcome additional obstacles on the path to debt recovery. 
According to the British Columbia Law Institute, these legal impediments “can be as 
time-consuming, elaborate, and expensive as the steps required to establish 
liability”.2 As a result, an effective and just civil justice system must provide the 
process by which individuals can enforce their judgments and obtain payment of 
monies they are owed.3
Although the mandate of the New Brunswick Department of Justice and 
Consumer Affairs is to promote the impartial administration of justice and to ensure
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protection of the public interest,4 one questions whether these objectives are actually 
attained by creating a legal system to determine and recognize rights without 
providing adequate means to enforce those rights.5 What is a judgment worth if one 
cannot enforce it? If members of the public and the business community do not have 
access to a fair and just legal system that includes an efficient and effective judgment 
enforcement component, their confidence in the system is damaged, and thus 
becomes a matter of public interest.6
The Law Reform Commission of Nova Scotia recently emphasized the vital 
role of judgment enforcement law within our justice system, and its impact on the 
public’s confidence in the civil justice system:
An enforcement system that is unduly complicated or costly, or that 
simply fails to deliver results, is certain to undermine the confidence of the 
public and foster cynicism about the administration of justice. Put simply, 
it is the responsibility of the state - part and parcel of the duty to maintain 
and promote the rule of law - to uphold its courts’ judgments with strong 
and effective enforcement action.7
This declaration reflects a growing consensus in Canada on the types of 
reform necessary to create a “modem, efficient and balanced enforcement system”.8 
This is in addition to three New Brunswick reports resulting from studies undertaken 
in 1976, 1985 and again in 1994, all advocating a complete overhaul of the current 
system of enforcement of judgments in the province via the enactment of modem 
judgment enforcement legislation. Kerr observed, in 1976, that our objective to strive 
for the pursuit of justice compels the enactment of a new judgment enforcement 
system which, on one hand, enables judgment creditors to recover their judicially
4 New Brunswick Justice and Consumer Affairs, Mandates, online: New Brunswick Government 
<http://www2.gnb.ca/content/gnb/en/contacts/dept_renderer. 146.1418.html#mandates>.
5 British Columbia 2005 Report, supra note 2 at 1.
6 Ontario 1996 Report, supra note 3.
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Law Reform Commission of Nova Scotia, 2011) at 7, online: Law Reform Commission of Nova Scotia 
<http://www.lawreform.ns.ca/Downloads/Enforcement%20of%20Civil%20Judgments%20- 
%20Discussion%20Paper.pdf> [Nova Scotia 2011 Report].
8New Brunswick Office of the Attorney General, The Proposed New Brunswick Enforcement Act 
(Executive Summary and Proposed Act), (Fredericton: Law Reform Branch, 1994), vol 1 at 6 [New 
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recognized debts from recalcitrant judgment debtors while, on the other hand, 
protects cooperative debtors who simply do not have the means to pay.9
To this end, three other provinces - Newfoundland and Labrador,10 Alberta11 
and Saskatchewan -12 have already enacted legislation consolidating judgment 
creditor remedies and modernizing their respective judgment enforcement laws. 
Moreover, the Uniform Law Conference of Canada (“ULCC”) released a Uniform 
Civil Enforcement o f Money Judgments Actn in 2004, which was endorsed, albeit 
with reservations, by the British Columbia Law Institute in 2005 and the Law 
Reform Commission of Nova Scotia in 2011.14
Although a complete historical and legal analysis o f judgment enforcement 
law is outside the scope of this study, this article aims to examine various issues 
within New Brunswick’s current legal and administrative framework by reviewing 
current legislation in other provinces as well as the Uniform Act and the judgment 
enforcement act proposed in the province’s 1994 report. The authors conclude that a 
new approach is fundamental to a fair, just, efficient, effective, impartial and 
accessible system of justice in our province and therefore recommend the enactment 
of the New Brunswick Judgment Enforcement Act (“NBJEA”).15
1.1 The current judgment enforcement system in New Brunswick
Since the province’s last report on this issue in 1994, New Brunswick has followed 
the national wave of legislative reform of secured financing law. Several legal 
advancements became effective in 1995 with the adoption of a new legal regime 
governing security interests pursuant to the Personal Property Security Act16
9 New Brunswick Ministry of Justice, Legal Remedies o f the Unsecured Creditor after Judgment by Karl J 
Dore & Robert W Kerr (Fredericton: Government o f New Brunswick, 1976) vol II at 240-241 [New 
Brunswick 1976 Report].
10 Judgment Enforcement Act, SNL, 1996, c J -l.l [Newfoundland Act].
11 Civil Enforcement Act, RSA 2000, c C-15 [Alberta Act].
12 The Enforcement o f Money Judgments Act, SS 2010, c E-9.22 [Saskatchewan Act], Although the Act 
was assented to May 20, 2010 is had not been proclaimed as of March 28,2012.
13 Uniform Civil Enforcement o f Money Judgments Act, online: Uniform Law Conference of Canada 
<http://www.ulcc.ca/en/usAJniform_Civil_Enf_Money_Judgments_Act_En.pdf> [Uniform Act].
14 British Columbia 2005 Report, supra note 2 and Nova Scotia 2011 Report, supra note 7.
15 See: Alberta Law Reform Institute, Enforcement of Money Judgments (Report), (Edmonton: ALRI, 
1991), vol 1 at 3 [Alberta 1991 Report]', British Columbia 2005 Report, supra note 2 at 1.
16 Personal Property Security Act, SNB 1993, c P-7.1 [PPSA]. Although the Act was assented to on May 
7, 1993, it only became effective on April 18, 1995.
(“PPSA”), such as the creation of a central computerized personal property registry 
(“PPSA Registry”) as well as the registration of judgments and elimination of the 
need to pursue judgment enforcement proceedings in order to assert priority as 
against a secured party.
Given that a debtor often has both secured and unsecured debts, it is 
anomalous that legislative reform has up to now privileged one set of creditors.17 
Although complementary provisions were added to the Creditors Relief Act18 as an 
interim step pending the introduction of a new judgment enforcement system, 
unsecured creditors must rely to this day on an assortment of new and old legislation, 
which dates back to the 19th century. In fact, the necessity and importance of 
legislative reform and consolidation of New Brunswick’s current judgment 
enforcement laws has been advocated for more than thirty-five years and is 
expressed as follows by Kerr:
From the description of the existing scheme of creditors’ remedies, it is 
apparent that the system is a complex and poorly interrelated collection of 
procedures. Many of these procedures originated in the complex legal 
system that existed before the major legal reforms of the last century and a 
half. These old procedures have been substantially modified by legislation 
during the last century and most are now substantially regulated by statute.
The reforms have proceeded on a rather haphazard basis, however, unlike 
the reforms in the remainder of the legal system which have endeavoured 
with considerable consistency to simplify and rationalize the system.19
As a result, a person dealing with the enforcement of judgments, whether a 
legal expert, enforcement personnel, creditor or debtor, must consider and peruse 
over 10 statutes as well as the Rules o f Court o f New Brunswick (“Rules o f Court”) in 
order to determine their rights and obligations.20 The current collection of statutes on 
this issue is not only numerous, but also comprised mostly of antiquated, fragmented,
17 Tamara M Buckwold & Ronald CC Cuming, Modernization of Saskatchewan Money Judgment 
I Enforcement Law (Final Report) (University of Saskatchewan, 2005) at 1, online: Government of
I Saskatchewan <http://www.qp.gov.sk.ca/orphan/JE_Final_Report.pdf> [Saskatchewan 2005 Report].
18 Creditors Relief Act, RSNB 1973, c C-33 .
19 New Brunswick 1976 Report, supra note 9 at 233. See also: Dunlop, a leading academic in the field, 
corroborating this conclusion: Charles RB Dunlop, Creditor-Debtor Law in Canada, 2d ed (Toronto: 
Carswell, 1995) at 9 [Dunlop], which is also cited in British Columbia 2005 Report, supra note 2 at 9.
20 See: Creditors Relief Act, supra note 18; Garnishee Act, RSNB 1973, c G-2; Arrest and Examinations 
Act, RSNB 1973, c A-12; PPSA, supra note 16; Assignments and Preferences Act, RSNB 2011, c 115; 
Absconding Debtors Act, RSNB 2011, c 100; Memorials and Executions Act, RSNB 1973, c M-9; Land 
Titles Act, RSNB 1973, c L-1.1; Registry Act, RSNB 1973, c R-6; Judicature Act, RSNB 1973, cJ-2; 
Rules o f Court of New Brunswick, NB Reg 82-73 [Rules o f Court].
overly complex and confusing legislative provisions. According to Cuming, the 
Creditors Relief Act is one of the most poorly drafted Acts in the statute books.21
The current enforcement system is therefore unnecessarily complex and 
costly for all parties involved since its long neglect has “resulted in many of its core 
concepts becoming encrusted with technicalities and uncertainties”.22 Attempting to 
enforce a judgment in New Brunswick or to advise clients on the matter can be a 
frustrating and unwieldy experience for most lawyers and enforcement personnel, let 
alone the self-represented litigant.23 Survey research in Nova Scotia evaluating the 
Small Claims Court revealed that the most significant element in need of reform was 
the “complexity and expense of collection efforts following judgments”.24 It would 
be most surprising if the majority of judgment creditors in the province o f New 
Brunswick would not express a similar complaint.
12  Basic principles
Given the objective to institute a modem, uniform, coordinated, efficient, and 
flexible judgment enforcement system, which will balance the interests of both 
creditors and debtors in a manner that is just and equitable, it is recommended that 
several overriding principles be endorsed and embraced by the NBJEA.25 These 
principles permeate the authors’ analysis as well as the resulting recommendations 
and judgment enforcement system proposed herein.
1.2.1 An effective enforcement system
Remedies are important to enable judgment creditors to overcome the repudiation of 
the debt by judgment debtors.26 As postulated by the British Columbia Law Institute, 
a just and effective judgment enforcement system must strive to provide legal tools
21 Ronald CC Cuming, The Enforcement of Money Judgments Act SS 2010, c E-922  (Analysis and 
Commentary, Version 1(c)) (University of Saskatchewan, 2010) at 4, online: Government of 
Saskatchewan <http://www.qp.gov.sk.ca/documents/misc-publications/emjabook-vlc.pdf> [Saskatchewan 
2010 Report]. Although Professor Cuming was referring to Saskatchewan’s Act, the same comment can 
be applied to New Brunswick’s Creditors Relief Act.
22 British Columbia 2005 Report, supra note 2 at 11.
23 New Brunswick 1994 Report, supra note 8, vol 1 at 3-4.
24 Nova Scotia 2011 Report, supra note 7 at 8.
25 New Brunswick Office of the Attorney General, Proposal for a System of Enforcement of Judgment 
Debts (Executive Summary) by John R Williamson (Fredericton: Office of the Attorney General o f New 
Brunswick, 1985) at 5 [New Brunswick 1985 Report]. See also: Saskatchewan 2005 Report, supra note 17 
at 3; Nova Scotia 2011 Report, supra note 7 at 6.
26 Alberta Law Reform Institute, Alberta Rules of Court Project: Enforcement of Judgments and Orders 
(Consultation Memorandum No. 12.11) (Edmonton, Law Reform Institute, 2004) at xiii, 1-2. [Alberta
2004 Report].
for judgment creditors to overcome the obstinacy of judgment debtors.27 In order to 
promote fairness among creditors, universal exigibility should also be prioritized 
such that all a debtor’s property should be subject to enforcement measures except 
property that is expressly exempted in the statute.28
1 2 2  A consolidated single statute governing enforcement of judgments law and 
creditor remedies
In 2004, the Alberta Law Reform Institute reviewed the consolidation of the 
judgment enforcement system enacted in 1994 and observed that: “the result has 
been confusion and conflicts among the various legislative instruments. The Act and 
the Regulation are relatively coherent, but the Rules are less integrated with the 
statutory scheme.”29 The Rules Project Committee concluded that “the confusion 
created by splitting one subject among several pieces of legislation outweighs any 
argument based on the ease of amendment”30 and recommended the integration of all 
I enforcement-related matters under one legislation. Their rationale was that if the law 
I is concentrated in one place it is more likely to be coherent and integrated, and that 
such consolidation would make the job of the researcher easier and therefore less 
expensive and uncertain.31
Given the foregoing analysis, it is recommended that common law concepts 
and obsolete approaches to judgment enforcement should be abandoned for newer 
policy choices and technological advancements, culminating in a single, coherent 
general enforcement of judgments statute. By consolidating all rules and legal 
principles related to creditor remedies and to the enforcement of judgments, a single 
code would clarify and streamline both new and existing processes including 
securing, seizing and liquidating assets.32
27 British Columbia 2005 Report, supra note 2 at 1.
28 Alberta 1991 Report, supra note 15 at 24-25; Nova Scotia 2011 Report, supra note 7 at 6; Saskatchewan 
2005 Report, supra note 17 at 3; British Columbia 2005 Report, supra note 2 at 16; Manitoba Law 
Reform Commission, Review of the Garnishment Act (Report), (Winnipeg: Manitoba Law Reform 
Commission, 2005) at 10.
29 Alberta 2004 Report, supra note 26 at 7.
30 Ibid at 23.
31 Ibid at xv and 8.
32 See: Alberta 1991 Report, supra note 15; Nova Scotia 2011 Report, supra note 7 at 6, 28; Saskatchewan
2005 Report, supra note 17 at 2-3; British Columbia 2005 Report, supra note 2 at 16, 18.
12 3  A centralized, technologically sophisticated and efficient provincial 
administration
A modem system of enforcement of judgments should be administered by a 
centralized enforcement office that acts on a province-wide basis.33 Several 
underlying reasons for this principle were summarized in the Saskatchewan 2005 
Report:
The proposed location of all enforcement activity in a single office is 
designed to replace the current fragmented system with one that is 
integrated and coherent. This would both eliminate the costs and 
inefficiencies associated with parallel processes and facilitate the 
development in the sheriffs office of a comprehensive expertise in 
supervision of the seizure and disposition of the all-inclusive range of 
assets that would be exigible under the Act. This may be expected to 
minimize the need for resort to the court for the resolution of matters of 
detail, thereby lowering the global cost of enforcement action.34
12.4 Limited judicial supervision
Once judgment is granted, an effective and efficient judgment enforcement system 
should strive to minimize judicial involvement and ensure that remedies are 
immediately available, thus enabling a judgment creditor “to immediately realize 
upon it, through the appropriate remedies, without returning to court for an 
additional order”.35 Nevertheless, the court should be available when directions are 
required to resolve substantive legal disputes, or for special enforcement orders when 
ordinary measures are ineffective or inappropriate.36
1.2.5 Protection of judgment debtor and third party interests
For the reform of the current system of judgment enforcement to be politically 
palatable, it must meet the general objective o f the pursuit of justice and provide just, 
equitable and balanced remedies for all parties involved.37 To attain this objective 
from both a creditor’s and a debtor’s point of view, the judgment enforcement
33 Alberta 1991 Report, supra note 15; Nova Scotia 2011 Report, supra note 7 at 6.
34 Saskatchewan 2005 Report, supra note 17 at 4-5.
35Nova Scotia 2011 Report, supra note 7 at 6, citing Alberta 2004 Report, supra note 26 at xiv.
36 Saskatchewan 2005 Report, supra note 17 at 8; Alberta 1991 Report, supra note 15 at 3, 27-28; Nova 
Scotia 2011 Report, supra note 7 at 6; British Columbia 2005 Report, supra note 2 at 16. See also: Alberta 
Act, supra note 11, s 5; Newfoundland Act, supra note 10, s 11; Saskatchewan Act, supra note 12, s 114; 
Uniform Act, supra note 13, s 7.
37 New Brunswick 1976 Report, supra note 9 at 240.
system must enable the highest possible satisfaction of a creditor’s claim while at the 
same time assuring the debtor that “he will not be deprived of the means to provide 
himself and his dependants with the continuing necessities of life”.38
As insisted upon by Buckwold and Cuming: “[d]ebtors and their families 
cannot be rendered destitute or financially dysfunctional by the implementation of 
judgment enforcement measures.”39 Judgment debtors and their dependants must 
therefore be protected from abusive creditor enforcement procedures, and the 
property that a debtor reasonably requires for the maintenance of his or her family 
should be clearly exempted by statute.40
In addition, judgment “debtors and affected third parties would be able to 
look to the court in circumstances in which judicial intervention may be 
warranted”.41 It is therefore recommended that the NBJEA provide mechanisms to 
resolve disputes arising during the enforcement process.42 Given the previous 
principle of limiting judicial supervision, the NBJEA should therefore provide the 
enforcement officer with a wide discretion to determine the appropriate course of 
action and the respective rights of the interested parties should a dispute arise 
between them.
However the enforcement officer’s decisions, as well as any other proposed 
or actual course of action, should be reviewable. Accordingly, any interested party 
could apply to the court within a prescribed period for a ruling that the enforcement 
officer’s determination is incorrect. A review of the enforcement officer’s decision 
should be possible in most cases but the enforcement officer’s determination would 
be final unless a court order is obtained.
12.6 Collective enforcement and sharing among judgment creditors
Initially, the common law established the rule of “first in time, first in right”, 
enabling the first enforcing judgment creditor to seize a judgment debtor’s property
38 Ibid at 240-41.
39 Saskatchewan 2005 Report, supra note 17 at 2.
40 Alberta 1991 Report, supra note 15, vol 1 at 254; Nova Scotia 2011 Report, supra note 7 at 26-27; and 
British Columbia 2005 Report, supra note 2 at 1.
41 Saskatchewan 2005 Report, supra note 17 at 8.
42 Notwithstanding its importance, this principle and its correlative measures o f enabling interested parties 
to contest an enforcement officer’s decision will not be repeated throughout this report.
to satisfy his or her judgment. Subsequent enforcement by any other judgment 
creditor was limited to the judgment debtor’s remaining property. However, as 
explained by Williamson, this rule was generally seen as unfair:
One major concern is that being the first in time may have little or nothing 
to do with the equity of one’s claim and may simply be the result of 
fortuitous circumstance. There is also the concern that such a system 
would cause a race to obtain judgment against the debtor that would be 
prejudicial to his economic survival and possible recovery from temporary 
economic hardship. This might result in a “get in quick” attitude on the 
part of creditors. Further, there is a more general sense that equality is 
equity and that there should be a basic rule that all creditors should share 
on a prorate basis.43
Given the foregoing, and considering the temporary federal legislative void 
in bankruptcy law from 1880 to 1919 that had previously prescribed the proportional 
sharing of the bankrupt’s property among ordinary creditors, most Canadian 
provinces enacted creditor relief legislation which sanctioned the compulsory 
distribution o f proceeds among all judgment creditors entitled by the statute to 
share.44 The Creditors Relief Act aimed to reverse the common law rule of “first in 
time, first in right” and abolish priorities among judgment creditors. Although 
federal legislation on insolvency was re-enacted in 1919 and once again included 
proportional sharing among ordinary creditors, most provinces, including New 
Brunswick, did little to amend their statutes. It remains unclear whether this 
legislative legacy resulted from a conscious and intentional choice, thereby 
confirming the intended objectives of the Act, or from simple legislative 
indifference.45
Nonetheless, the retention of the principle of proportionate sharing among 
judgment creditors, currently embodied in New Brunswick’s Creditors Relief Act, by 
almost all Canadian reports on the subject46 further confirms that this principle 
should continue to guide the NBJEA and its provisions.
43 New Brunswick 1985 Report, supra note 25 at 308.
44 Dunlop, supra note 19 at 415-17. See also: Saskatchewan 2010 Report, supra note 21 at 141. See also 
Lyman R Robinson, “Distribution o f Proceeds of Execution: An Examination of the Common Law, 
Creditors' Relief Legislation, Modem Judgment Enforcement Statutes and Proposals for Reform” (2003)
66 Sask L Rev 309 at paras 8-14 [Robinson], A review of the history and objectives of the Creditors Relief 
Act was also undertaken by Williamson in the New Brunswick 1985 Report, supra note 25 at 308-313.
45 Saskatchewan 2010 Report, supra note 21 at 141. See also Robinson, supra note 44.
46 Saskatchewan 2005 Report, supra note 17 at 3; British Columbia 2005 Report, supra note 2 at 1. The 
“consensus in Canada” refers to Dunlop, supra note 19 at 1-3. The only exception cited in the New 
Brunswick 1985 Report, supra note 25 at 310, was Law Reform Commission of British Columbia, Report 
on Attachment of Debts Act (Victoria: Law Reform Commission of British Columbia, 1976).
1.2.7 A unitary approach to enforcement
A unitary, streamlined and integrated approach to enforcement is further 
recommended to ensure that not only legal experts but individuals wishing to avail 
themselves of the judgment enforcement system will comprehend the NBJEA. A 
unitary approach is thus recommended not only in the remedies available but in the 
nature o f the enforcement process itself.
Proposed by the Uniform Act and adopted in Saskatchewan, this single, 
multifaceted and integrated approach replaces the plethora of current remedies with a 
single enforcement remedy: seizure of assets. Seizure may be accomplished either by 
the sheriff directly or by a receiver appointed by the court in appropriate 
circumstances for that purpose.47 In either case, the type of asset no longer 
determines the remedy available to the judgment creditor. Rather, a judgment can be 
enforced either by actual physical seizure of the property or by Notice of Seizure on 
a person in possession or control of the asset, which can have the same legal impact 
as an actual seizure.
In addition, a unitary approach to enforcement and the principle of 
proportionate sharing among judgment creditors naturally leads to the notion of 
collective enforcement. It is recommended that the NBJEA not only authorize but 
also require the enforcement officer to enforce judgments on behalf of creditors who 
have filed a Notice of Enforcement. The prerequisite to provide detailed enforcement 
instructions to the Sheriff should be abolished. As a result, judgment creditors will 
no longer be required to discover or assess a judgment debtor’s property nor provide 
security for enforcement costs, except as specified in the NBJEA.
1.2.8 Optional creditor control over enforcement proceedings
Notwithstanding the principle o f collective enforcement, the NBJEA should provide 
a judgment creditor with the option of “driving” or controlling the enforcement 
process should he or she so desire. The aim of involving the judgment creditor stems 
from both the wish of the creditor to remain involved and the social benefit of 
minimizing the cost of resolving disputes when settlement is reached between the 
parties without any third party involvement. As noted in the New Brunswick 1976
47 Saskatchewan 2005 Report, supra note 17 at 8. See also British Columbia 2005 Report, supra note 2 at 
16, describing the Uniform Act. The Newfoundland Act, supra note 10 and the Alberta Act, supra note 11 
also make great strides in this direction even though both statutes preserve garnishment as a distinct 
remedy, operating alongside seizure of assets.
Report: “[s]uch a settlement is part of the normal conduct o f business by the parties 
and is readily absorbed into the normal costs of the business. Maintenance of private 
involvement through to the final remedy stage encourages the maximum extent of 
private settlement.”48
Given the objective of the NBJEA to provide accessible and efficient 
enforcement services, creditor involvement should be encouraged and authorized, 
but only on a voluntary basis. In other words, when judgment creditors, 
unsophisticated or otherwise, must resort to enforcement services, they should not be 
compelled to dictate every detail of the enforcement proceedings. A choice should 
therefore be offered to remain involved in the enforcement process or to rely on the 
services of the enforcement office. This flexibility is a hallmark of the new 
enforcement system and an innovative element in the NBJEA. It is expected, 
however, that most creditors will rely on the expertise and experience of the 
enforcement office.
Given the basic principles above, it is clear that the protection of judgment 
debtor and creditor interests remains a priority and will therefore be further discussed 
in the following sections on preservation orders and exempt property before 
embarking on a review of the proposed structure, administration and procedures 
contemplated for the NBJEA.
2 . P r e s e r v in g  j u d g m e n t  c r e d it o r  in t e r e s t s
2.1  The current law in New Brunswick
Prejudgment remedies are pre-emptive legal devices designed to assist a creditor in 
protecting the debtor’s assets from illegitimate disposition or removal from 
jurisdiction pending the adjudication of the claim for damages so that the debtor’s 
exigible assets will be available for recovery, seizure and sale following a judgment. 
Multiple pre-judgment remedies exist in one form or another in the various Canadian 
provinces and commonwealth states. The most common are the Mareva injunction 
and the attachment of debts before judgment (or prejudgment garnishment).
The Mareva injunction (sometimes also referred to as a “freezing order”) 
takes its name from one of the first cases in which this injunctive remedy was 
granted: Mareva Campania Naviera SA v International Bulk Carriers SA, in which 
Lord Denning stated that: “[i]f it appears that the debt is due and owing, and there is 
a danger that the debtor may dispose o f his assets so as to defeat it before judgment,
48 New Brunswick 1976 Report, supra note 9 at 253.
the court has jurisdiction in a proper case to grant an interlocutory judgment so as to 
prevent him disposing of those assets”.49
In its leading decision on the subject, Aetna Financial Services Ltd v 
Feigelman,50 the Supreme Court of Canada confirmed the existence and availability 
of the Mareva injunction in Canada. The Court held that the plaintiff must put 
forward a “strong prima facie case”51 and that there must be assets of the defendant 
susceptible to execution, and a “real risk that the remaining significant assets of the 
defendant are about to be removed or so disposed of by the defendant as to render 
nugatory any judgment to be obtained after trial”.52 The overriding consideration is 
whether the defendant has threatened to “so arrange his assets as to defeat his 
adversary, should that adversary ultimately prevail and obtain judgment, in any 
attempt to recover from the defendant on that judgment”.53
In New Brunswick, this equitable remedy is also governed by Rule 40.03 of 
the Rules of Court, which provides that: “[w]here a person claims monetary relief, 
the court may grant an interlocutory injunction to restrain any person from disposing 
of, or removing from New Brunswick, assets within New Brunswick o f the person 
against whom the claim is made”.54
The New Brunswick Court of Appeal held, in Canadian Imperial Bank of 
Commerce v. Price, that the Mareva injunction is an extraordinary remedy that 
should only be granted in appropriate cases under the following four guidelines 
applicable to the plaintiff:
(1) The plaintiff must make full and frank disclosure of all material 
matters within his or her knowledge.
(2) The plaintiff must give particulars of the claim, including a basis for 
the claim and the amount claimed. The plaintiff must also fairly state his
49 Mareva Campania Naviera SA v International Bulk Carriers SA, [1975] 2 Lloyd's Rep 509 at 510. Prior 
to the development of the Mareva injunction, courts had long held that a plaintiff could not obtain an 
interlocutory injunction to restrain the defendant from disposing of or dealing with his or her assets: Lister 
& Co. v Stubbs, [1886-90] AU ER Rep 797.
50 Aetna Financial Services Ltd v Feigelman,[ 1985] 1 SCR 2 [Aetna Financial Services].
51 Ibid at para 30.
52 Ibid at para 25.
53 Ibid.
54 Rules o f Court, supra note 20, r 40.03(1).
knowledge of the defendant’s defence. The material presented to the judge 
must establish a prima facie case on the merits.
(3) The plaintiff must give grounds for believing that the defendant has 
assets within the jurisdiction. The assets should be established with as 
much precision as possible so that, in appropriate cases, the injunction 
may be issued against specific assets. The Court will be reluctant to tie up 
all of the assets of a defendant who is a Canadian citizen and resident in 
the jurisdiction.
(4) The plaintiff must persuade the court that the defendant is removing, or 
that there is a risk that he or she is about to remove, assets from the 
jurisdiction in order to avoid a possible judgment. Alternately, it may be 
shown that the defendant is disposing of assets in a manner out of the 
ordinary course of business so as to make tracing of assets remote or 
impossible.55
However, where assets are moved in and out of a jurisdiction in the ordinary course 
of business, the applicant will have difficulty meeting the standard and the injunction 
will likely not be ordered.56
Rule 40.03, however, does not address relief ancillary to these injunctions, 
leaving some doubt as to the court’s jurisdiction to make any such orders, even 
though circumstances may be such that a creditor cannot fully ascertain which 
specific assets should be covered by the order without obtaining this information 
from third parties or directly from the debtor.57
In New Brunswick, garnishment o f debts owed to judgment debtors is not 
available before judgment, except as provided by the Absconding Debtors Act.58 This 
Act aims to facilitate the recovery of a debt from a debtor (not necessarily a 
judgment debtor) who departs from the province, or is keeping himself concealed 
within the province, but has not concealed his property from his creditors. However, 
it is a relatively unused statute.59
55 Canadian Imperial Bank o f Commerce v Price (1987), 81 NBR (2d) 181 (CA) at 187-88 [Price],
56 In Aetna Financial Services, supra note 50 at paras 41-43, the Supreme Court o f Canada ultimately 
found that a Mareva was not appropriate. The defendant was a federally incorporated company with 
authority to carry on business in Canada, and, in the course o f doing so, moved assets in and out the 
jurisdiction (Manitoba in this case). No improper purpose was exposed, and there was no evidence of an 
intention to move assets out o f Canada.
57 A J Bekhor & C o U d v  Bilton, [1981] 2 All ER 565, at 576.
58 Absconding Debtors Act, supra note 20, s 2.
59 There appear to be less than 10 reported decisions dealing with the Absconding Debtors Act.
In provinces where pre-judgment attachment is available, a plaintiff can 
move to have sums garnished and paid into court, preserving the money until the 
action is decided on its merits.60 However, the remedy is limited to claims for a "debt 
or liquidated demand". To prevent abuse, courts require strict observance of the 
statutory requirements set down to govern such orders. In some jurisdictions, a 
plaintiff will need to satisfy the court that he will likely suffer prejudice if the 
prejudgment attaching order is not granted.61 The property subject to a prejudgment 
attaching order is generally the same as that caught by a post judgment garnishing 
order.
2 2  The case for reform and recommendation
The case for inclusion of pre-judgment remedies in the NBJEA is strong, given the 
unavailability of prejudgment garnishment, the need for coherence and consistency 
in the application of all prejudgment remedies and the relatively high threshold 
currently governing Mareva injunctions. Since one of the objectives of the NBEJA is 
to create a coherent, comprehensive and consolidated system of judgment 
enforcement, it is only fitting that prejudgment remedies be included, allowing all 
available avenues in one single piece of legislation governing the requirements to 
obtain relief.
The NBJEA should therefore address all prejudgment remedies by adopting 
in substance Part 4 of the Uniform Act, which creates a single prejudgment remedy 
called a “preservation order”62, replacing Mareva injunctions and including the 
possibility of attaching debts before judgment.
As with a Mareva injunction, a preservation order would not adversely 
affect the rights of secured creditors of the debtor since the order would not confer 
ownership of the assets to the applicant or give the applicant a security interest in the 
assets.63 The property affected by the preservation order would be subject to the 
ordinary rules for judgment enforcement set out elsewhere in the NBJEA, once 
j  judgment is properly obtained. As such, the property that has been protected pending 
J litigation could be seized to satisfy the judgment o f one judgment creditor even 
though the preservation order may have been obtained by another.
60 For example, pre-judgment attachment is allowed by the Attachment o f Debts Act, RSS 1978, c A-32, s 
2.
61 See: e.g. Osman Auction v Belland, 1998 ABQB 1095.
62 See also: Saskatchewan Act, supra note 12 at Part II; Newfoundland Act, supra note 10, s 27, which 
refers to an “attachment order”.
63 Bank of Montreal v Faclaris (1984), 48 OR (2d) 348 (HC).
The NBJEA should set out the grounds for issuing preservation orders, while 
assuring that our courts retain appropriate discretion when assessing applications. 
Generally guided in principle by the case law, which has thus far governed various 
prejudgment remedies, the NBJEA would set out the basic requirements to be 
satisfied by a party seeking a preservation order.
Four general principles should govern preservations orders: 1) the relative 
strength o f the applicant’s action for a judgment; 2) the risk that removal or 
disposition of property will hinder or frustrate the enforcement of an eventual 
judgment; 3) whether it is just, in the circumstances, to issue a preservation order; 
and 4) the preservation order should cause no more inconvenience to the defendant 
than is necessary.
Given that all prejudgment remedies are interlocutory in nature, the NBJEA 
should, first of all, restrict the availability of preservation orders to plaintiffs who can 
demonstrate, at the very least, some reasonable chance of obtaining a judgment. The 
issue of the specific threshold to be applied is difficult. A very high threshold limits 
the availability of preservation orders to those cases where there is little to no doubt 
as to the outcome of the case, while a less stringent threshold makes preservation 
orders more accessible, tying up assets pending the litigation of cases with mitigated 
chances of success.
Not all jurisdictions require the same demonstration of a “strong case” to 
obtain preservation remedies. In practice, the distinction between, for example, a 
“prima facie case” 64 and a “strong prima facie case” 65 is not helpful and difficult to 
apply on limited affidavit evidence. As such, strong consideration should be given to 
making the relative strength o f the applicant a factor to be considered without being 
determinative in and of itself.
It is therefore recommended that the NBJEA adopt the factors outlined in the 
Alberta Act to govern the discretion o f the court in granting preservation orders.66 
While the Uniform Act provides, inter alia, that the court may grant a preservation
64 Price, supra note 55 at 187-88 and Montreal Trust Co o f Canada v Occo Developments Lid, (1998) 197 
NBR (2d) 347 (QB),at3.
65 Suggested, at least, by the Supreme Court o f Canada in Aetna Financial Services, supra note 50, at para 
7.
66 Alberta Act, supra note 11, s 17(2). See also New Brunswick 1994 Report, supra note 8, vol 1, proposed 
NBEJA, s 17(2Xa) [ NBEJA 1994].
order when “the facts alleged in support of the plaintiffs claim, if proven at trial, are 
sufficient to establish the plaintiff’s claim for the payment of money”,67 this 
language is best suited for ex parte applications. The Alberta Act provides that the 
court may grant an “attachment order” if it is satisfied that “there is a reasonable 
likelihood that the claimant’s claim against the defendant will be established”.68
As a result, the NBJEA should not require an applicant to demonstrate that 
ultimate success in the litigation is a foregone conclusion. Rather, a creditor should 
be required to show that he or she has a good cause of action. The authors contend 
that the overriding principle should be whether it is just and convenient that a 
preservation order be issued in light of all of the circumstances, which requires an 
examination of the relative strength of the creditor’s claim based on the record before 
the court.
Secondly, prejudgment remedies have often been predicated on the 
requirement to show an intention on the part of the defendant to dispose of his 
property, or otherwise make it unavailable in an effort to thwart the enforcement of 
an eventual judgment. However, since intent is always difficult to establish and must, 
in virtually all cases, be inferred from the circumstances, it should not be a factor 
governing the issuance of preservation orders. The goal is to preserve exigible assets 
and not to police the defendant’s motives. As such, preservation orders should be 
available where an applicant can show that the unavailability of assets will seriously 
hinder collection efforts once judgment is obtained. This criterion also aims to 
address the need to allow a defendant to meet reasonable and ordinary business or 
living expenses, without regard to motive per se.
Thirdly, akin to the balance of convenience prong of the well-known three- 
part test that governs interlocutory injunctions, the court must be satisfied that it is 
just, in the circumstances, to issue a preservation order.
Lastly, the NBJEA should adopt the principle of minimum disruption as a 
governing factor for preservation orders.69 Preservation orders should only go so far 
as is necessary to be effective and should not be overreaching. As much as possible, 
the order should allow the defendant to use property for normal and ordinary 
business or individual purposes and should not affect more property than is
67 Uniform Act, supra note 13, s 16(2).
68 Alberta Act, supra note 11, s 17(2)(a).
69 NBEJA 1994, supra note 66, s 18.
reasonably necessary to satisfy an eventual judgment in light of the applicant’s 
claim.
The NBJEA would further establish the procedure to seek preservation 
orders and address such issues as the possibility of obtaining a time-limited 
preservation order ex parte and the ability to obtain ancillary orders, such as orders 
for the examination of the defendant or third parties. Evidentiary requirements would 
demand that the applicant make full and frank disclosure, because preservation 
orders are injunctive and must require that the applicant come to court with “clean 
hands”. Full disclosure would include all known facts material to the application, 
including those facts that do not favour the applicant’s case, including any and all 
known defences to the claim.
Preservation orders, by their nature, restrict the defendant’s freedom to use 
or deal with his property before the plaintiff has fully proved his claim. Especially 
worrisome is the potential to deprive the defendant of the use of income-earning 
assets or goods sold in the context of a business undertaking:
This sub-rule or exception can lead to serious abuse. A plaintiff with an 
apparent claim, without ultimate substance, may, by the Mareva exception 
to the Lister rule, tie up the assets of the defendant, not for the purpose of 
their preservation until judgment, but to force, by litigious blackmail, a 
settlement on the defendant who, for any one of many reasons, cannot 
afford to await the ultimate vindication after trial.70
As such, appropriate safeguards must tightly control preservation orders, preventing 
their use for improper purposes or sheer tactical advantage in litigation. Ex parte 
orders should, o f course, be time limited.
Under the Uniform Act, a creditor is normally required to post security to 
obtain a preservation order,71 which can be later used to compensate the debtor or a 
third party who suffered damages as a result o f the preservation order being issued. 
In addition, the NBJEA should expressly stipulate that the applicant is deemed to 
have given an undertaking as to damages which may be suffered by the defendant 
should the action against him ultimately fail, as is currently the case under Rule
70 Aetna Financial Services, supra note 50 at para 43.
71 Under the Uniform Act, the applicant is, by default, is required to post security. By contrast, the 1994 
NBEJA, supra note 66, s 23(3) gives discretion to the Court to require security.
40.04.72 The NBJEA should also provide the defendant a right to vacate the order by 
providing adequate substitute security.
3 . P r o t e c t in g  j u d g m e n t  d e b t o r  in t e r e s t s
3.1 The current law in New Brunswick
The judgment debtor’s counterpart to the judgment creditor's preservation order is 
the protection of exempted property. Enforcement of a judgment is only possible as 
against “exigible” property and income of the judgment debtor, which entails that 
some property and income are exempt from seizure or receivership. Exigible 
property can be seized by a judgment creditor pursuant to Rule 61 of the Rules of 
Court as well as subsection 26(1) of the Memorials and Executions Act. Exceptions 
for the seizure of personal property are governed by the Memorials and Executions 
Act at subsection 33(1), which provides protection for furniture and furnishings, 
ordinary apparel, limited food and fuel, certain trade tools, seeds and grain, domestic 
animals and medical equipment.73
In addition, the PPSA provides a different list of personal property exempt 
from seizure by a secured party, which includes limited furniture, a limited value 
motor vehicle, medical equipment, and some consumer goods if they pass a hardship 
test.74
New Brunswick has also exempted from seizure life insurance money or 
rights that have been designated in favour of certain beneficiaries.75As such, an 
RRSP, a Registered Retirement Income Fund (“RRIF”) or a Deferred Profit Sharing 
Plan (“DPSP”) (all as defined in the federal Income Tax Act16) held with a life 
insurer and designated as payable to the insured’s “spouse, child, grandchild or 
parent” is exempt from seizure.77 Likewise, money transferred in certain 
circumstances from a pension fund to a prescribed retirement savings arrangement or
72 See also NBEJA 1994 , supra note 66, s 23(1).
73 Memorials and Executions Act, supra note 20, s 33(1).
74 PPSA, supra note 16, s 58(3).
75 Insurance Act, RSNB 1973, c 1-12, s 157(2).
76 Income Tax Act, RSC 1985, c 1 (5th Supp.).
77 Insurance Act, supra note 75, s 1 “life insurance” (g).
utilized to purchase a life annuity under the Pension Benefits Act is exempt from 
execution, seizure or attachment or other process of law.78
As a result, current legislation exempts RRSPs and other products 
purchased from insurance companies, while other (i.e., non-insurance) RRSPs appear 
to be available to creditors as a means to satisfy a judgment debt. Arguably, these 
rules also apply to RRIFs and DPSPs. The complete protection of pension plans 
contrasted against the relative exigibility o f RRSPs creates a striking unfairness.
Notwithstanding these statutory exemptions, current jurisprudence suggests 
that, while a trust-based RRSP cannot be subject to an Order for Seizure and Sale, it 
could be subject to other post-judgment enforcement remedies, such as equitable 
execution via the appointment of a receiver.79 In comparison, if the RRSP is not 
trust-based, it may be subject to an Order for Seizure and Sale.80
Although money in the possession of the debtor and other types of 
“securities for money” can be seized by a judgment creditor pursuant to subsection 
26(1) o f the Memorials and Executions Act, the seizure of income is mostly achieved 
through garnishment, as most debtor income comes from third party sources. The 
Garnishee Act,81 however, provides a statutory exemption for wages due to the 
judgment debtor for his or her personal labour and services on a hiring.82 Quite 
arbitrarily it would seem, professional income, income from self-employment or 
from a business are not necessarily considered “wages” and would not be protected 
fully, if at all.83 Additionally, as discussed above, some income or money derived 
from a Registered Retirement Savings Plan (“RRSP”) may also be exempted.
78 Pension Benefits Act, SNB 1987, c P-5.1, ss 36(1), 57; General Regulation, NB Reg 91-195, s 20. No 
reference is made in the General Regulation to a DPSP as a prescribed “retirement savings arrangement”. 
However, subsection 57(6) o f the Pension Benefits Act enables creditors under orders for support or 
maintenance to seize or attach up to 50% of refunds of contributions with interest and other exempted 
property under the Act, unless ordered by a court of competent jurisdiction.
79 Watt v Trail, 2001 NBCA 58, affd [2000] NBJ No 515 (QB).
80 Belliveau v Royal Bank of Canada,( 2000) 224 NBR (2d) 354 (CA). Although not considered by New 
Brunswick courts, the same reasoning may also apply to RRIFs.
81 Garnishee Act, supra note 20.
82 Ibid s 31. Wages can, however, be garnished in the case o f a failure to pay spousal or child support or 
to pay federal taxes.
83 In National Sea Products Ud. v Caissie, (1987) 85 NBR (2d) 72 (QB), Miller J. held that section 31 of 
the Garnishee Act would not apply to protect money owed to a self-employed fisherman for fish sold and 
relates to “the contract for personal services and labour only”.
The current judgment enforcement process in New Brunswick also allows 
for the seizure and sale of land without distinction as to its use. Enforcement 
proceedings may be taken against land whether the effect is to seize the debtor’s 
principle residence, or any other type of land (vacant lot, recreational land, etc.). 
However, access to land as a means of judgment enforcement has restrictions. First, 
land may be seized and sold under execution as personal estate only if the sheriff has 
exhausted the debtor’s personal estate, if any is found.84 Second, enforcement against 
land also requires that the sale by the sheriff be advertised at least four times during a 
period of sixty days prior to the day of the sale.
In practice, enforcement against land is often the option of last resort, given 
that land will frequently be subject to the interest of a secured mortgagee or a co­
owner. As such, the judgment creditor must factor in not only the cost of the sheriffs 
sale, but also the rights of secured creditors to be repaid first and the right of the third 
party to his or her equity in the land. Furthermore, land may also be subject to 
unregistered interests pursuant to the Marital Property Act85 or some other resulting 
trust. It is worthy to note that the Memorials and Executions Act does not specifically 
address the situation of co-ownership in land, whether by joint tenancy or tenancy in 
common.
3.2 The case for reform and recommendations
Given that judgment enforcement is currently governed by an uncoordinated set of 
rules found in several statutes, regulations and common law principles without 
consistency or cohesiveness, the case for reform is strong. The complexity of 
ascertaining what property and income is exigible to satisfy a judgment debt 
illustrates this well.
Indeed, the determination of what property and/or income is exigible to 
satisfy a judgment debt in New Brunswick requires reference to the Memorials and 
Executions Act, the PPSA and the Garnishee Act, while factoring in the specific 
exemptions created by the Pension Benefits Act and the Insurance Act. In addition, 
reference to the Securities Transfer Act86 is required where a judgment creditor 
wishes to seize securities or security entitlements, such as shares in a business 
corporation.
84 Memorials and Executions Act, supra note 20, s 11.
85 Marital Property Act, SNB 1980, c M-1.1.
86 Securities Transfer Act, SNB 2008, c S-5.8.
The list of exempted property in the Memorials and Executions Act is 
antiquated and does not reflect modem realities. The prohibition against the 
garnishment of wages, but not of other types of income, and the differential 
treatment of RRSPs and registered pension plans also raises concerns of unfairness. 
Since there is no justifiable reason to distinguish between exigible property for 
secured and unsecured creditors, it is recommended that New Brunswick follow in 
the footsteps of Alberta, Newfoundland and Saskatchewan, which have all enacted a 
comprehensive modem statute to govern the entire enforcement system, including 
exemptions of property from seizure.
In addressing property exempted from judgment enforcement, the NBJEA 
should follow the principle of the universal exigibility of property, subject only to 
specific exemptions and the need to afford debtors sufficient protection to see to their 
personal security and basic needs, as well as those of their dependants.87 A guiding 
principle in deciding between total or partial exemptions is the need for debtors to 
maintain personal security and a reasonable standard of living for themselves and 
their dependants and to continue to earn income. As expressed by one of the basic 
principles, debtors and their families cannot be rendered destitute or financially 
dysfunctional by enforcement measures undertaken by creditors.
The exemption of RRSPs and similar plans from seizure and garnishment 
has been considered by other jurisdictions that have moved towards modem 
judgment enforcement legislation and has been discussed by various law reform 
commissions. In 1999, the ULCC adopted the Registered Plan (Retirement Income) 
Exemption Act, which directly addressed the availability of RRSPs for seizure and 
garnishment, and sought to eliminate the unfairness created by the differential 
treatment.88 Similarly, the Uniform Act moves to exempt all rights, property and 
interest in RRSPs, DPSPs and RRIFs from seizure and further exempts a portion of 
payments out of such plans.
The Alberta Law Reform Institute pointed out differences between 
registered pension plans and RRSPs, in its 2002 report entitled Creditor Access to 
Future Income Plans:
Opponents of the exemption minimize the similarity between pensions, 
which are locked in by legislation, and RRSPs, most of which can be
87 Saskatchewan Act, supra note 12, s 37(1): Except as otherwise provided in this Act, all property is 
subject to seizure and disposition pursuant to this Act and to an order of the court made pursuant to this 
Act.
88 The Uniform Registered Plan (Retirement Income) Exemption Act, ULCC 1999, online: ULCC 
<http://www.ulcc.ca/en/poam2/index.cfm?sec=1999&sub= 1999ha>.
collapsed at will by the debtor. It is said that pensions are really intended 
to provide money for retirement, while RRSPs are also a source of money 
during the working years of the debtor. RRSPs are closer to tax sheltered- 
bank accounts while pension funds are dedicated to retirement, and are 
tightly controlled by pension boards, supervised by government.89
While those differences between RRSPs and traditional pension plans exist, 
RRSPs remain, for the vast majority of Canadians, the substitute to a pension plan 
where access to a plan is not possible. There are simply insufficient reasons to justify 
not creating an exemption for RRSPs, RIFFs and DPSPs, as concluded by the 
Alberta Law Reform Institute:
Such distinctions are hard to explain. Insurance and non-insurance vendors 
of RRSPs, DPSPs and RRIFs have copied each other’s products to the 
point that the products are today largely indistinguishable from each other.
Yet the insurance product is totally exempt while the similar plan 
purchased from another vendor is completely exposed to creditors’ 
remedies. No respondent to our consultation memorandum sought to 
defend directly this apparent unfairness. If the products are virtually the 
same, it seems unjust and intolerable that they should be treated so 
differently in exemptions law. The injustice is more clear where 
employers offer private sector plans, like group RRSPs or DPSPs, as 
substitutes for or supplements to pensions. Such substitute plans serve 
much the same purpose as pensions but are not protected by pension
• • QOexemption provisions.
A total exemption for RRSPs, RIFFs and DPSPs as defined in the Income 
Tax Act (Canada) should therefore be included in the NBJEA to protect these sources 
o f future income from seizure.91 In addition, income withdrawn or paid out of those 
plans (i.e., current obligation or future obligation) should be partially exempted, 
making it subject to the same monetary caps which define the exemption for 
employment and other income proposed below.
The authors further recommend that the NBJEA generally adopt the 
exempted income provisions of the Uniform Act. This would bring about substantial 
changes in New Brunswick law, as protected income would no longer be limited to
89 Alberta Law Reform Institute, Creditor Access to Future Income Plans (Consultation Memorandum No. 
11), (Edmonton: ALRI, 2002) at 38.
90 Alberta Law Reform Institute, Exemption of Future Income Plans (Final Report No. 91) (Edmonton: 
ALRI, 2004) at 43.
91 New Brunswick 1994 Report, supra note 8 at 19.
“wages” but would also incorporate, to certain levels, other types of income, 
including payments out of an RRSP, RIFF or DPSP. As such, basic levels of income 
required to afford debtors security and the ability to provide for basic needs would be 
provided without undue regard to the type o f income.
Strict adoption of the Uniform Act in this regard is not recommended, 
however, because the definition of “income” found in its section 164 appears to be 
too restrictive to capture some forms of income (income from self-employment, for 
example). Rather, the NBJEA should adopt the approach taken in the Saskatchewan 
Act, which provides for a prescribed amount o f employment income to be exempted 
and further provides that a debtor who receives income that is not employment 
income is entitled to “an income exemption in an amount that approximates the 
exemption to which the judgment debtor would be entitled if all income received by 
the judgment debtor were employment remuneration”.92
Furthermore, income exemptions in the NBJEA should be calculated as 
suggested in the Uniform Act, which provides that a judgment debtor is entitled to his 
net income to the extent of a prescribed minimum amount and fifty percent of his net 
income which exceeds the minimum prescribed amount, but subject to a prescribed 
maximum total exemption. Prescribed amounts should be set according to what a 
debtor needs to support himself and his dependants, with the prescribed amount 
varying depending on the number of dependants. Harmonisation on this issue with 
other judgment enforcement legislation as well as the Bankruptcy and Insolvency 
Act93, which has clear guidelines94 to determine a bankrupt’s surplus income, should 
be an objective o f the NBJEA. Furthermore, the NBJEA should allow both creditors 
and debtors to apply for adjustments or variations of income exemptions in 
prescribed circumstances.
The sale of land represents another important judgment enforcement 
remedy, which will be further discussed in section 5.2.5. In regards to exempt 
property, however, the NBJEA should also contain an exemption for accumulated 
equity in a principle residence in order to protect judgment debtor interests. The 
NBJEA should also contain an exemption for accumulated equity in a principle
92 Saskatchewan Act, supra note 12, s 96(1). Similarly, the NBEJA1994, supra note 66, defined income as 
“property o f an enforcement debtor which he or she has the right to receive which is the nature o f income 
from any source including an office, employment, property or business.”
93 Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, RSC 1985, c B-3.
94 Superintendent o f  Bankruptcy Canada, Directive No. 11R2-2012, Surplus Income, online: 
Superintendent of Bankruptcy Canada <http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/bsf-osb.nsf/eng/br02787.html>.
residence.95 In keeping with the principle of universal exigibility, it is recommended 
that the prescribed amount for a principal residence be modest. While the need for 
shelter is part of the basic necessities of life, no individual has a right to “own the 
roof over one’s head”. Consequently, the NBJEA should provide a small exemption 
for the equity in a judgment debtor’s principal residence, allowing the debtor to pay 
the reasonable expenses of securing and moving to a new shelter should the principal 
residence be seized and sold.96
The NBJEA should therefore include specific exemptions for property and 
income to be excluded from seizure. The exemptions currently found in the 
Memorials and Executions Act and the PPSA would generally remain, but with some 
modernization of the language, inspired by the Uniform Act. As such, property that 
should be exempted would include:
• Food required by the debtor and his or her dependents;
• Necessary clothing of the debtor and his or her dependents up to a certain 
prescribed value;
• Household furnishings, utensils, equipment and appliances up to a certain 
prescribed value;
• One motor vehicle having a prescribed realizable value;
• Medical or health aids necessary to enable the debtor or a dependent to 
work or to sustain health;
• Interest in the judgment debtor’s principal residence, including a mobile 
home, up to a certain prescribed value;
• Domestic animals which are kept as pets and not used for a business 
purpose;
• Personal property used by and necessary for the debtor to earn income from 
his or her occupation, trade, business or calling up to certain prescribed 
values which would take into account certain commercial activities, such as 
farming and fishing;
• Basic prescribed levels of income;
• A pension plan; and
• RRSPs, RIFFs and DPSPs as defined in the Income Tax Act (Canada).
95 Such an exemption is proposed in the Uniform Act, supra note 13, s 159(lXe) and has been adopted by 
the legislation: Newfoundland Act, supra note 10, s 131(1 )(h), Saskatchewan Act, supra note 12, s 93(2) 
and Alberta Act, supra note 11, s 88(g).
96 New Brunswick 1994 Report, supra note 8, vol 1 at 18.
Maximum values for some exempted property should be set by regulation to ensure 
that these values can be easily and efficiently revisited and adjusted according to 
changing times and increases in cost o f living.
4. NBJEA ADMINISTRATION AND ENFORCEMENT INITIATION
4.1 The current law in New Brunswick
The current system of judgment enforcement in New Brunswick could best be 
described as a creditor-driven self-help system. Once a judgment is obtained, it is up 
to the judgment creditor to take enforcement measures in an attempt to collect. The 
avenues available to a judgment creditor are found in several acts and in the Rules of  
Court.97
With the introduction o f personal property securities legislation and the 
creation o f a centralized registry for judgments in 1995, New Brunswick abandoned 
the link between the enforcement process and the crystallization of priority 
positioning for a judgment creditor. Marking a fundamental departure from pre- 
PPSA legislation and its requirement that enforcement procedures be commenced in 
order to charge property, registration of a Notice of Judgment by a judgment creditor 
now creates at once a charge on the judgment debtor’s present and after-acquired 
personal property and the ability to enforce the judgment.98 The PPSA Registry is 
province-wide, so that only one registration is required to cover all counties o f the 
province. Similarly, by operation of subsection 2.3(9) of the Creditors Relief Act, an 
enforcement proceeding for the purpose of enforcing a money judgment shall not be 
commenced until a Notice of Judgment has been registered in the PPSA Registry.
Creditors are also well-advised to register their judgment in one or both real 
property registries established in the province if  they wish to “bind” or charge land, 
either to exert pressure on the judgment debtor by rendering the land practically 
unsellable, or enforcing against the land to satisfy the judgment. Registration of a 
memorial o f judgment in the appropriate land registry office remains a requirement 
to bind land not yet registered under the new Land Titles Registry.99 Pursuant to the 
Memorials and Executions Act, a memorial o f judgment providing for the payment
97 The number of different legislative sources governing enforcement is well illustrated in the definition of 
“enforcement proceedings” found in the Creditors Relief Act, supra note 18, at s2.1:‘“enforcement 
proceeding’ means any proceeding authorized by the Absconding Debtors Act, Arrest and Examinations 
Act, Creditors Relief Act, Garnishee Act, Judicature Act, Memorials and Executions Act or the Rules of 
Court to be taken for the purpose of enforcing a money judgment or for the purpose o f enforcing the 
claims o f creditors against the personal property of a debtor”.
98 Ibid, s 2.2(1).
99 Registry Act, supra note 20.
of money may be registered in the registry office of the county in which the debtor’s 
lands are situated and will therefore bind the debtor’s lands for a period of 5 years.100 
If the debtor has lands in more than one county, registration of a memorial of 
judgment is necessary in each and every county in which his or her lands are located.
The newer Land Titles Actm  also provides for the registration of memorials 
of judgment at sections 40 to 46 of the Act. Subsection 40(4) provides that an 
application to register a memorial of judgment may be made in respect o f more than 
one parcel of land registered under the Act. Section 46 further provides that where 
there is a conflict with the provisions of the Memorials and Executions Act, sections 
40 to 45 of the Land Titles Act, which provide that registration is parcel specific, 
apply.
This more streamlined and modem approach automatically binds the 
debtor’s present and subsequently-acquired property, making the registration of 
interests the ultimate statutory source for the establishment of priorities. Having 
registered his or her judgment, the judgment creditor obtains priority over any 
subsequently registered interests. The efficiency of this registration is revealed when 
the judgment debtor comes to deal with his or her property. As the property is bound 
on registration, neither future purchasers nor secured parties will want to deal with 
the property without the judgment debtor paying off the judgment to free the 
property of the encumbrance.
Pursuant to the priority scheme under the PPSA, a registered judgment has 
priority over an unperfected security interest regardless of whether the security 
interest attaches before or after the judgment is registered.102 As a result, a properly 
registered judgment will have priority over unperfected security, subsequently 
registered security or any other encumbrance provided that the aforementioned 
encumbrance does not benefit from a statutory preference in the PPSA or any other 
statute. Examples of encumbrances holding statutory preferences within the PPSA 
include repairer’s liens103 and purchase money security interests (“PMSF’s)104, which
100 Memorials and Executions Act, supra note 20, ss 5-6. A memorial o f judgment is obtained from the 
Clerk of Court of Queen’s Bench or the Registrar of the Court of Appeal.
101 Land Titles Act, supra note 20.
102 PPSA, supra note 16, ss 19, 20(lXa). See also Catherine Walsh, An Introduction to the New Brunswick 
Personal Property Security Act, (Fredericton: New Brunswick Geographic Information Corporation,
1995) at 110 -11 [Walsh], CIBC v CTV Television, 2005 NBQB 429 at paras 24-25.
103 PPSA, supra note 16, s 32 as well as Re Giffen [1998] 1 SCR 91.
104 PPSA, supra note 16, s 34.
can be generally defined as security taken on collateral where it secures the purchase 
price. In comparison, the Land Titles Act simply provides at section 19 that:
[instruments and interests or claims thereunder in respect of or affecting 
the same land shall be entitled to priority, the one over the other, 
according to the order of the registration numbers, dates and times 
assigned to the instruments by the registrar and not according to the date 
of their execution.105
Once a judgment is registered, enforcement measures must be initiated and 
driven by the creditor. Before being able to enforce a judgment, however, it is 
imperative to discover all the necessary information with respect to the debtor’s 
property and financial affairs.106 Currently, the law in New Brunswick offers a 
judgment creditor two options for gathering necessary information with respect to 
the debtor. A judgment creditor can use the Arrest and Examinations Act to examine 
a judgment debtor under oath before a judge or a clerk of the court as to any property 
and any debts owing to or by him.107 After such an examination, a judgment debtor 
may be ordered to pay the judgment amount in one sum or make instalments.108 A 
judgment creditor can also use Rule 61.14, entitled Examination in Aid of 
Enforcement, not only to discover the debtor’s assets, income, debts and any means 
to satisfy the judgment, but also to enquire about the disposal of any property since 
the cause of action began.109 The advantage of using the Rules o f Court is that the 
examination is recorded and a transcript can be produced to be used as evidence 
should the need arise, as in proceedings to have a transfer or an assignment declared 
fraudulent.110
Under the current system, a creditor can therefore demand disclosure of the 
judgment debtors’ assets and choose to enforce a judgment, subject to some 
restrictions, via a seizure and sale o f real and personal property, a garnishment of 
debts owed to the judgment creditor or a court payment order punishable by 
contempt. To access these enforcement remedies, an unsophisticated creditor or a 
creditor faced with a complex case must resort to expensive legal advice to enforce a 
judgment, given the current absence of any public assistance from the government.
105 Land Titles Act, SNB 1981, c L -l.l s 19(1).
106 New Brunswick 1985 Report, supra note 25 at 84.
107 Arrest and Examinations Act, supra note 20, s 30. In practice, most o f these examinations are 
conducted before the cleric of the court.
108 Ibid, s 45(1).
109 Rules of Court, supra note 20, r 61.14.
110 lb id ,r  33.13,33.14.
Faced with a recalcitrant debtor, an application to the clerk of the court is required to 
either request an Order for Seizure and Sale pursuant to Rule 60 of the Rules of  
Court or request an examination of the judgment debtor as to his or her means of 
discharging the judgment pursuant to the Arrest and Examinations Act, following 
which a payment order may be made. Another enforcement initiative available to 
judgment creditors is a court application for an attaching order pursuant to the 
Garnishee Act. These enforcement measures will be further discussed in detail.
However, when a debtor fails or refuses to provide complete disclosure, the 
entire process can be frustrated. Although such behaviour is punishable by a 
contempt order, courts are reluctant to grant this remedy unless a creditor has made 
several attempts to convene the judgment debtor to an examination and an 
application before the court is truly the “last resort”. This remedy is not readily 
granted because it calls for the court to issue a warrant for the debtor’s arrest.111 
Although frustration with such reluctance may be warranted, imprisonment is seen as 
an excessively harsh consequence of “enforcing” a court order. As a result, the court 
will more often merely threaten rather than imprison the debtor.112 Ultimately, the 
existing procedure is “frustrating, expensive and ineffective”.113
In addition to the complexity and additional cost — not only for legal 
services, but also collection costs such as security deposits to the sheriff and service 
fees — judgment creditors are responsible to serve and provide notice of the solicited 
order to the relevant party and supervise its execution. The limited assistance 
provided by the enforcement system is provided by the sheriff in his or her role in 
the execution of an Order for Seizure and Sale. There are currently eight regional 
sheriff services located in each of the judicial districts of the province which provide 
“a system for the service of documents, the execution of court orders in civil matters, 
jury management, the transportation of individuals in custody, and the provision of 
court security for the Court of Queen's Bench, the Court of Appeal and the Provincial 
Court in certain areas of the province”.114
111 Alberta 2004 Report, supra note 26 at para 282.
112 Ibid at para 283.
113 Ibid at para 284. The authors reiterate this observation based on their personal experience in New 
Brunswick.
114 NB Government, online:
<http://www2.gnb.ca/content/gnb/en/contacts/dept_renderer. 146.1418.html#mandates>.
At present, sheriffs play a limited role in the enforcement of judgments in 
New Brunswick.115 With security deposits generally ranging from $2000 to $3000 to 
cover anticipated expenses of seizure and sale, and the relatively low number of 
successful seizures, it is not surprising that New Brunswick’s enforcement system is 
criticized and denounced by judgment creditors and their legal advisors. This 
perceived inability or unwillingness of the sheriffs to aggressively undertake and 
pursue the enforcement of judgments is not limited to New Brunswick.
In Saskatchewan, the legal profession complained that their creditor 
clientele was not satisfied that the sheriffs were getting “the job done”.116 Buckwold 
and Cuming surmised that the “perceived reluctance of the sheriff to take aggressive 
action is to a great extent a product of three related realities”,117 which it is hereby 
suggested are equally applicable to New Brunswick. The unwillingness of sheriffs to 
proceed without appropriate security for costs posted by the instructing judgment 
creditor and the lack o f required personnel and resources may inevitably be a product 
of a user-pay system. A third reality which may explain in part the first two is:
the sheriffs potential liability for action taken in error in the course of 
enforcement under a writ of execution. At present, the sheriff may be 
strictly and personally liable in trespass for overstepping his or her 
authority to enter premises for purposes of effecting seizure, or in 
conversion for the seizure of property that is apparently but not in fact 
property of the judgment debtor. Exacerbating the problem is the fact that 
the law governing the liability of the sheriff is antiquated, obscure and 
poorly understood. It is unsurprising, then, that sheriffs are reluctant to act 
unless they feel impervious to an award of damages, whether by virtue of 
their confidence that liability will not arise under the circumstances, or of 
the protective cover of security posted by the instructing judgment 
creditor.118
4.2 The case for reform and recommendations
A review of the numerous studies undertaken across the country and their respective 
reports reveals a few fundamental issues in the choice of structure, administration 
and underlying rules and principles for the proposed judgment enforcement system. 
As with most governmental policies, potential answers to these questions should be
115 For e.g.: CBA Conference, November 4,2011 “Juge, greffier, sheriff : ce qu’ils ont à nous dire”. [CBA 
Conference].
116 Saskatchewan 2005 Report, supra note 17 at 6.
117 Ibid.
118 Ibid at 6-7.
examined against the standards of effectiveness, efficiency, systemic cost and 
fairness, always guided by the basic principles previously outlined.
4.2.1 A central, provincial co-ordinated enforcement office
Pursuant to the authors’ review of legal discourse on this issue and, in particular, the 
possible privatisation of enforcement services, the resulting recommendation favours 
a provincial public administration with a unitary and integrated approach to 
enforcement given its many advantages, among which are the following:
• Complete and accurate information about a debtor is more likely to be 
available to government than to private agencies.
• Enforcement measures could be adjusted more appropriately to the 
resources of the debtor on the basis of this better information.
• Consolidation of claims by a single government agency for collection 
would also assist in working out a collection program that the individual 
debtor can meet. In addition, such consolidation could reduce 
bookkeeping and similar processing costs.
• Involvement of government in the provision of creditor remedies provides
119a mechanism for monitoring the enforcement system.
In accordance with the above endorsement o f a public enforcement office, 
previous recommendations on the administrative structure of New Brunswick’s new 
enforcement of judgment system are hereby reiterated. As was recommended in the 
province’s three previous reports on the enforcement of judgments, a unified, 
centralized and co-ordinated enforcement office is recommended.120 As Williamson 
advocated in 1994: “exclusive authority must be vested in one enforcement office to 
co-ordinate all enforcement proceedings against a debtor”.121 As a result, 
enforcement proceedings and orders should originate and be conducted through the 
enforcement office rather than the judicial system or the clerk’s office.
The full endorsement of previous reports is limited, however, to the New 
Brunswick 1976 Report. Contrary to the New Brunswick 1985 and 1994 Reports 
which gave the enforcement office a limited role of coordinating the system12 , the
119 New Brunswick 1976 Report, supra note 9 at 249-50.
120 Ibid at 275-276; New Brunswick 1985 Report, supra note 25 at 6-13; New Brunswick 1994 Report, 
supra note 8, vol 2 at Sum Rpt 2-4.
121 New Brunswick 1994 Report, Ibid at Sum Rpt 4.
122 Ibid at Sum Rpt 8.
creation of a government office to control and implement judgment enforcement 
measures is once again recommended. In addition to the aforementioned benefits o f a 
provincial public enforcement office, there are numerous advantages ensuring its 
efficacy and increasing the efficiency within the administrative structure, such as:
• coordination by centralizing all enforcement proceedings;
• consistency in the operation of the enforcement system enabling better 
planning and preparation by creditors and ensuring fair treatment of 
debtors;
• efficiency through the experience, professionalism and expertise 
developed within a central co-ordinated office;
• technological advancements have eliminated various obstacles to a 
provincial co-ordinated office which can easily be implemented through 
the existing administrative structure of the sheriffs services;
• accuracy and accessibility of province-wide and updated data on 
enforcement proceedings;
• elimination of the costs and inefficiencies associated with parallel 
processes;
• development in the enforcement office of a comprehensive expertise in the 
supervision of the seizure and disposition of assets;
• lowering the global cost of enforcement action by minimizing the need to 
resort to the court and supplanting the role of the clerk in hearing debtor 
examinations and issuing payment orders and orders of seizure and sale.123
The authors’ recommendation is further corroborated by a recently 
successful legislative reform in the province on enforcement proceedings. 
Interestingly, New Brunswick enacted and proclaimed the Support Enforcement 
Actn4 in 2008, which created a new Office of Support Enforcement. A Director of 
Support Enforcement with the Family Support Orders Service (“FSOS”) located in 
each judicial district is responsible for the administration of this Act. Federal and 
provincial laws give FSOS the authority to use various enforcement measures to 
collect overdue support payments. For example, the FSOS may initiate a payment 
order either directly to the payer or to a third party (often an employer); demand 
information about a payer’s location, contact information, salary, employment, 
assets, or any other information that is considered necessary to enforce the order; 
report a payer to a credit bureau if  the payer owes an amount greater than three 
months of support payments; or bring an enforcement hearing before the Court.125 
During a recent conference, the new FSOS office, program and enforcement methods 
created by the Support Enforcement Act were touted as a great improvement and
123 Ibid at Sum Rpt 9 and Saskatchewan 2005 Report, supra note 17 at 5.
124 Support Enforcement Act, SNB 2005, c S-15.5.
125 The Family Support Orders Service (FSOS), online: New Brunswick Government 
<http://www.gnb.ca/0062/fsos/newsite/fsos-page2-e.asp#8>.
seem to be much more efficient and successful in enforcing support orders and 
maintaining a steady flow of child and spousal support payments to families and 
children.126 In fact, FSOS collects more than $43 million in support every year in 
New Brunswick.127
In addition to this recent success, New Brunswick created Service New 
Brunswick (SNB) in 1992 in response to pressure to enhance access and delivery of 
government services. The mandate of this crown corporation is to make government 
services more accessible through one-stop service centres, as well as through the 
Internet and over the phone. The SNB Online website leverages technology to 
maximise customer satisfaction and represents a significant transformation in the 
way citizens access government information, services and products.128 The potential 
of a central source to facilitate the enforcement o f judgments has also been embraced 
by the Law Reform Commission of Nova Scotia in its recent report: “One o f the 
major goals of adopting something like the Uniform Act, then, would be to create, as 
much as possible, a one-stop shop to assist creditors, debtors and enforcement 
officials in determining when and how to proceed with regard to the various assets 
that may be available”.129
With these resounding successes and templates, a new public judgment 
enforcement system can become a reality in New Brunswick. Learning from these 
experiences, enforcement services can and should be funded by the users or the 
individuals responsible for the need to access such services. As observed in the New 
Brunswick 1976 Report: “[i]n so far as the debtor is unwilling to pay a genuine 
claim, it is probably in accord with the normal sense of justice that the debtor should 
bear the cost of his own default. Where the debtor is unable to pay, however, the 
imposition of additional collection costs only adds injury to injury.”130 In order to 
avoid undue enforcement costs for all parties involved, measures and procedures will 
be recommended below to streamline the enforcement process and to determine 
more efficiently and more rapidly a debtor’s capacity and willingness to pay. 
Consequently, if the cost of enforcement is not a material net loss to government, 
there is no reason for it to be under resourced or to have recourse to other parties to 
execute enforcement remedies.131
126 CBA Conference, supra note 114.
127 New Brunswick Justice and Consumer Affairs, online: New Brunswick Government 
<http://www.gnb.ca/0062/fsos/newsite/fsos-whowhat-e.asp>.
128 Institute for Citizen-Centred Service, Service New Brunswick, online: Institute for Citizen-Centred 
Service <http://www.iccs-isac.org/en/pubs/Case%20Study%20-%20New%20Brunswick.pdf>.
129 Nova Scotia 2011 Report, supra note 7 at 20-21.
130 New Brunswick 1976 Report, supra note 9 at 245.
131 Saskatchewan 2005 Report, supra note 17 at 6-7.
Nonetheless, even if  limited public funds are required, as is currently the 
case, the New Brunswick 1976 Report justifies this public expenditure: “The direct 
public cost o f the system is shared by everyone in society through the general tax 
burden. Society in return receives a benefit from easier maintenance of public peace 
when remedies are processed through public facilities”.132
4.2.2 Creation of enforcement charge
Since 1995, the issuance and delivery o f an Order of Seizure and Sale to the Sheriff 
has been unnecessary for the purpose of binding or affecting an “enforcement 
charge” on the property of the debtor. Registration of a Notice of Judgment in the 
PPSA Registry and the respective land registries is sufficient to protect the judgment 
creditor’s interests. Considering that the current state of the law in the province is 
precisely what is recommended by the ULCC, it is recommended that the NBJEA 
adopt the status quo, but expressly provide for the creation of an enforcement charge 
upon the registration of a judgment in the PPSA Registry.133 In addition, the current 
administrative and procedural structure applicable to the registration o f judgments 
remains applicable and can simply be fine-tuned for the purposes of the NBJEA.
Likewise, the NBJEA should also adopt the current requirement for 
registration as a qualifier for initiating enforcement proceedings as well as 
participating in the distribution of the proceeds of enforcement.134 Registration of a 
Notice of Judgment against the property of the debtor goes beyond simple issues of 
convenience and public notice. Registration o f a Notice of Judgment becomes the 
prescribed precursor to enforcement, informing all parties involved of their 
respective interests in the property of the judgment debtor and enabling each creditor 
to determine his or her next course of action.
In addition to the enforcement charge created on the judgment debtor’s 
present and after-acquired personal property upon registration of the Notice of 
Judgment in the PPSA Registry, the NBJEA must address the appropriate procedure 
to create an enforcement charge on land. Given that the manner in which judgments 
are registered and enforced against land varies significantly among provinces and
132 New Brunswick 1976 Report, supra note 9 at 242.
133Uniform Act, supra note 13, s 29.
134 Creditors Relief Act, supra note 18, ss 2.3(9), 2.3(13). The latter section provides that “[a] judgment 
creditor is not entitled to share in the proceeds of a levy by the sheriff against the personal property o f the 
judgment debtor under this Act unless the creditor has registered a notice o f judgment under subsection 
2.2(1) ”
territories, the Uniform Act suggests two possible options for future legislative 
reform of judgment enforcement law.
Option 1 of the Uniform Act reflects the practices that have been adopted by 
Newfoundland and recommended in the Saskatchewan 2001 Report.135 It allows for 
the creation of the enforcement charge against all property of the debtor, including 
real property, without registration of a Notice of Judgment in the registry system or 
land titles. Cuming and Buckwold initially proposed that “a single registration in the 
Registry would create an enforcement charge on both the personal property and land 
owned by the judgment debtor at the date of the registration or acquired any time 
thereafter while the judgment remains registered”.136 An interested purchaser of real 
property would therefore have to obtain a search result in both the Land Titles 
Registry as well as the PPSA Registry to determine whether the land is subject to an 
enforcement charge. As observed by the British Columbia Law Institute, the older 
practice of registering judgments in a general registry could “compromise the 
integrity of the land title system”.137 Since New Brunswick has also adopted a land 
titles registry system, Option 1 of the Uniform Act is not recommended.
In comparison, Option 2 of the Uniform Act reflects the practices adopted in 
Alberta and proposed in the 1994 NBJEA. It provides generally that registration 
under a province’s Land Titles Act is necessary prior to charging the property o f the 
debtor. In 1994, Williamson endorsed abolition of the requirement that registration 
occur in the registry office of the county where the debtor’s lands are situated in 
order to bind unregistered land. The New Brunswick 1994 Report recommended as 
follows:
In the case of land subject to the land registry system, a notice of judgment 
registered on the PPSA Registry will bind the debtor’s land by creating a 
general lien on all present and after-acquired land anywhere in the 
Province. The legal effect of registration will be unchanged from that of 
the current registration of a “memorial of judgment” exception that a 
single registration will bind the land anywhere in the Province.
Land subject to the Land Titles Act (registered land) will be dealt with 
slightly differently than land subject to the Registry Act. In the case of 
registered land, registration of the notice of judgment on the title will also 
be required and only a specific lien will be created.
135 Tamara M Buckwold and Ronald CC Cuming, Modernization of Saskatchewan Money Judgment 
Enforcement Law (Interim Report) (University of Saskatchewan, 2001) at 167-170, online: 
<http://www.qp.gov.sk.ca/orphan/reporta.pdt».
136 Ibid, at 169.
137 British Columbia 2005 Report, supra note 2 at 180.
There will be no exceptions to the obligations placed on third parties to 
search the PPSA Registry or the Land Titles Office for notices of 
judgment affecting the debtor’s land.138
As recommended in 2001, Saskatchewan did eventually adopt legislation that creates 
a Judgment Registry for all judgments regardless of the nature of the property against 
which a judgment is ultimately enforced.139 However:
registration of the judgment in the Judgment Registry, although a 
mandatory step, does not give rise to an enforcement charge affecting an 
extant interest in land of the judgment debtor. The charge arises with 
respect to a specific interest in land of the judgment debtor, [...] only 
when the judgment is registered in the land titles registry against the 
interest. There is, however, a parallel between the effect of a registered 
judgment on personal property and land. A judgment registered in the 
Judgment Registry automatically results in an enforcement charge 
affecting land acquired by the judgment debtor and registered in the land 
title registry after the registration has been affected.140
In Saskatchewan, subsection 172(1) the Land Titles Act, 2000 provides for 
an automatic registration in the Land Titles Registry of a registered judgment 
creditor’s interest against the judgment debtor’s after-acquired title or interest in 
land. Any interest registered is therefore subject to any interest based on a registered 
judgment where there is an exact match between the name of the debtor on the 
judgment and the name of the interest holder on the interest registered.141
Given the foregoing, the authors recommend that the NBJEA adopt the 
Saskatchewan approach. As a result, a judgment debtor’s existing interest in 
registered land could only be charged by a judgment registered in both the PPSA 
Registry and the land titles registry. Furthermore, a judgment registered in the PPSA 
Registry would create an enforcement charge if the judgment debtor thereafter 
acquires a registered interest in land as soon as that interest is registered in the land 
titles registry.
138 New Brunswick 1994 Report, supra note 8, vol 1, at 9-10.
139 Saskatchewan Act, supra note 12, ss 18-21.
140 Saskatchewan 2010 Report, supra note 21 at 61. See also Land Titles Act, 2000, SS 2000, c L-5.1, s 
172-173.
141 Land Titles, ibid, s 53(2).
4 2 3  Priority of an enforcement charge
Contrary to other provinces, there is no need for a substantive reform of the law 
governing priorities in New Brunswick, since: “when New Brunswick adopted its 
PPSA, reform of judgment enforcement law was in the air, enabling it to take the 
next logical step in the evolution of the law governing priority between judgment 
creditors and secured parties”.142 Although a review of the current law on security 
interests and their interaction with other interests or encumbrances on the debtor’s 
property may be appropriate given that the PPSA already dates back to 1995, an in- 
depth analysis of the priority schemes contemplated by the PPSA and the Land Titles 
Act is beyond the scope of this research project and the authors are not aware of any 
major issues in need of reform.
The law in New Brunswick currently provides that an enforcement charge 
created by the registration of a judgment has the same priority in relation to both 
prior and subsequent interests in the judgment debtor’s property charged as a 
perfected security interest, other than a PMSI, as defined by the PPSA.143 This rule, 
which is present in all legislative reforms on judgment enforcement law in the 
country, should continue to guide the NBJEA’s priority scheme.
As a result, unlike other provinces, the NBJEA and the rules for determining 
priority between an enforcement charge and other interests in the judgment debtor's 
property can be modeled on the provisions of the province’s current objectives of the 
Creditors ’ Relief Act and the legislative provisions o f the PPSA and the Land Titles 
Act, thereby easing the implementation of the NBJEA in the province. It is the 
opinion of the authors that these enactments provide for effective methods of 
determining priority among encumbrance holders. Given the ease with which New 
Brunswick can streamline all three legislative regimes dealing with security interests 
and their enforcement, it is recommended that the NBJEA make the priority rules of 
the PPSA and the Land Titles Act, which are applicable in determining the priority of 
a perfected security interest, applicable to determining the priority of an enforcement 
charge created in relation to other security interests except as otherwise provided in 
the NBJEA.144
Notwithstanding the goal of consolidation and simplification, a new 
judgment enforcement process should have a set of clearly established rules to
142 Walsh, supra note 102 at 111.
143 PPSA, supra note 16, s 20(1). See also: Alberta Act, supra note 11, ss 34,42(1); Newfoundland Act, 
supra note 10, ss 48,49; Saskatchewan Act, supra note 12, s 23.
144 Uniform Act, supra note 13, ULCC comment on s 35(1).
govern priorities of enforcement charges in a judgment debtor’s property.145 
Reference to applicable legislation, such as the PPSA, should be clearly established 
in the NBJEA, as has been done in the Saskatchewan Act.146 The importance of this 
consolidation o f rules is further apparent when one considers that the rights of 
secured and non-secured creditors are subject to the statutory priorities of preferred 
creditors originating in several legislative enactments.147 As a result, the 
determination o f priority ranking for judgment creditors in New Brunswick remains 
an endeavour requiring the reconciliation of several pieces of legislation all enacted 
for varying purposes.
The authors therefore advance once again the 1976 recommendation that:
any statutory priorities which do exist, like the existing priorities of 
employees and landlord, be incorporated [... in the judgment enforcement 
legislation] to show clearly their relationship to the distribution of moneys 
under the Act, and that the provision be made to ensure that such priorities 
are not affected by the person entitled to priority delivering [ of a Notice 
of Enforcement.]148
Such an approach is found in the Saskatchewan Act, which specifically provides that 
an enforcement charge is subordinate to a landlord’s right of distress exercised 
before the enforcement charge came into existence.149
Although the PPSA also establishes the priority of liens150, of PSMIs151 and 
of buyers and lessees of the judgment debtor’s property in the ordinary course of 
business152, these should be fine-tuned in the NBJEA to provide for enforcement 
charges. In addition, several interests will need further examination to be adapted to
145 British Columbia 2005 Report, supra note 2 at 90.
146 Saskatchewan Act, supra note 12, s 29.
147 See e.g.: Employment Standards Act, SNB 1982, c E-7.2, Mechanics ’ Lien Act, RSNB 1973, c M-6, 
Wage Earners Protection Act, RSNB 2011, c 235, Real Property Tax Act, RSNB 1973, c R-2, Revenue 
Administration Act, SNB 1983, c R-10.22.
148 New Brunswick 1976 Report, supra note 9 at 29-30.
149 Saskatchewan Act, supra note 12, s 27(3).
150 PPSA, supra note 16, s 32. See also: Alberta Act, supra note 11, s 40; Newfoundland Act, supra note 
10, s 57; Saskatchewan Act, supra note 12, s 23; Personal Property Security Act, 1993, SS 1993, c P-6.2, s
32 [Saskatchewan PPSA],
151 PPSA, supra note 16, s 34. See also: Alberta Act, supra note 11, s 35(3); Newfoundland Act, supra note 
10, s 50(3); Saskatchewan Act, supra note 12, s 23; Saskatchewan PPSA, supra note 149, s 34.
152 ppsA  supra note 16, s 30. See also Alberta Act, supra note 11, s 36; Newfoundland Act, supra note 10, 
s 52; Saskatchewan Act, supra note 12, s 25.
the NBJEA, such as future advances153, fixtures and growing crops154 as well as 
negotiable instruments and chattel paper.155
It is further recommended that the NBJEA follow — albeit with a few 
modifications156 -- the guiding principle of collective enforcement, leading to the 
proportional sharing among judgment creditors. This principle is expressed by the 
statutory rule that nothing in the relevant part of the NBJEA dealing with priorities 
creates a priority between or among enforcement charges.157 As a result, subject to 
certain allowed costs and preferences, the balance of a distributable fund is 
distributed among all eligible claims on a pro rata basis. A lack of priority between 
judgment creditors is a just and equitable approach to distribution given the 
economic and physical realities faced by judgment creditors in completing the 
judgment enforcement process. Departure from a sharing system does not appear to 
be warranted and the sharing system offers many benefits:158
a) Because delay in initiating enforcement proceedings is less likely to 
prejudice the priority of creditors’ claims under a system of pro rata 
distribution, creditors may be encouraged to extend additional time to 
debtors for the payment of their debts.
b) Pro rata distribution may reduce the incentive of creditors to petition a 
debtor into bankruptcy as a means of attaining a pro rata sharing of a 
debtor's assets. Because of the high up-front costs that creditors must incur 
to petition a debtor into bankruptcy, this is not an economically viable 
option for creditors with relatively small claims to attain pro rata 
distribution.
c) Having been a hallmark o f creditors' relief legislation in Canada for one 
hundred years, pro rata distribution has been reaffirmed in the enactment of 
modem judgment enforcement legislation.
153 PPSA, supra note 16, s 14. See also: Saskatchewan Act, supra note 12, ss 23(4)-(5).
154 PPSA, supra note 16, ss 36 and 37. See also: Alberta Act, supra note 11, s 37; Newfoundland Act, 
supra note 10, s 53; Saskatchewan Act, supra note 12, s 24.
155 PPSA, supra note 16, s 41. See also Alberta Act, supra note 11, s 38; the Newfoundland Act, supra note 
10, s 54; Saskatchewan Act, supra note 12, s 25.
156 The NBJEA proposed by the authors would not adopt the same qualifications to share the distributable 
fund and thus does not recommend the creation of preferred payments for judgment creditors upon 
distribution.
157 See: Alberta Act, supra note 11, s 42(2); Saskatchewan Act, supra note 12, s 27(1); the Uniform Act, 
supra note 13, s 38(4).
158 Robinson, supra note 44 at para 30.
While it may be appropriate to reward secured creditors for their initiative in 
registering a security, this concept of reward does not correspond with the varying 
realities faced by judgment creditors in completing the judgment enforcement 
process. Some judgment creditors may face years of litigation to obtain a minimal 
award while other judgment creditors may easily obtain a default judgment on issues 
of complex law simply due to the fact that the defendant did not have the material 
and physical resources to defend the claim. It is thus inappropriate to assign priorities 
between these two sets o f encumbrance holders based on time alone.
The NBJEA will therefore need to address the priority relationships among 
interests in seized property, in particular between enforcement charges and security 
interests. Under current judgment enforcement law, as well as the recommended rule 
for the NBJEA, the priority of intervening secured creditors is preserved 
notwithstanding the absence of priority among enforcement charges. As explained by 
the ULCC: “if a security interest in property is registered after the creation of an 
enforcement charge and a subsequent enforcement charge is created after the 
registration of the security interest, the security interest is not subordinate to the 
second enforcement charge merely because it is subordinate to the first enforcement 
charge”.159 Nonetheless, an interest in property that is subordinate to an enforcement 
charge is subordinate only to the extent o f the amount recoverable under the 
judgment to which the enforcement charge relates at the time enforcement 
proceedings are taken against the property.160
42.4 Initiation of the enforcement process -  Notice of Enforcement
Although the current scheme of support and maintenance orders provides for 
automatic enforcement procedures as soon as the order or agreement takes effect, the 
same policy reasons do not apply to the enforcement of civil judgments. In fact, there 
is an overwhelming consensus that the initiation of an enforcement procedure should 
require some positive step by judgment creditors. According to section 40 of the 
Uniform Act, a “judgment creditor who wishes to initiate an enforcement proceeding 
must deliver an enforcement instruction to an enforcement officer” and “identify the 
enforcement proceedings that the enforcement officer is requested to undertake”. 
Similarly, the Saskatchewan Act further requires “a description of property known or 
believed by the judgment creditor to be property of the judgment debtor, and the 
location of that property” along with a registry search and specified serial numbers of 
any goods to be seized.161 Under these enforcement systems, the enforcement officer 
is not required to implement any enforcement measures unless the sheriff has
159 Uniform Act, supra note 13, ULCC comment on section 38(1). See also: Alberta Act, supra note 11, s 
42(1).
160 Uniform Act, supra note 13, s 38(3).
161 Saskatchewan Act, supra note 12, s 31. See also: Newfoundland Act, supra note 10, s 72.
received proper enforcement instruction according to these acts.162 In addition, an 
enforcement officer is authorized to refrain from taking an enforcement proceeding 
until he or she receives a satisfactory undertaking or security for the payment o f the 
enforcement officer’s fees and estimated expenses relating to the enforcement 
proceeding, unless the court orders otherwise.16
Notwithstanding the creditor-driven approach of the Uniform Act, an 
enforcement officer may decline to undertake an enforcement proceeding should the 
enforcement instruction be contrary to the Act or a court order, or if it cannot be 
undertaken in good faith and in a commercially reasonable manner.164 In the 
Saskatchewan Act, a sheriff may refuse to proceed as instructed if  the requested 
measure is not commercially “reasonable or practicable”, is “not permitted by law” 
or if all of the requirements of the Act have not been met.165 As commented by 
Cuming: “[t]o use a method of enforcement involving high costs that produces little 
or nothing to be applied to the judgment would be to act in a commercially 
unreasonable manner”.166
The enforcement officer is therefore not bound to enforce the judgment in 
the manner requested by the judgment creditor, and it seems the enforcement officer 
possesses significant scope to determine the appropriate enforcement measure, if 
any.167 In practice, however, unless the enforcement instruction is invalid or will not 
yield any recovery beyond enforcement costs, the officer will most likely proceed as 
instructed. The legislative provisions as drafted in the Saskatchewan Act and the 
Uniform Act limit the enforcement officer’s discretion. In the event there is a more 
efficient enforcement measure which may have a lesser impact on the judgment 
debtor and may have been even negotiated with the debtor, the officer may not be 
able to act without the judgment creditor’s consent.
On a procedural level, the contemplated initiation process does not differ 
substantially from the current enforcement system in place in New Brunswick. 
Notice must be given in both cases, either by the current Order for Seizure or Sale or 
the proposed enforcement instructions. Judgment creditors must still investigate the 
judgment debtor’s situation and current assets at their own expense in order to
m Saskatchewan Act, ibid, s 30(2); Uniform Act, supra note 13, s 40.
163 Uniform Act, ibid, s 40(4); Saskatchewan Act, supra note 12, s 34(4).
164 Uniform Act, ibid, s 10, ULCC comment on s 40.
165 Saskatchewan Act, supra note 12, ss 34(1), (2), 115.
166 Saskatchewan 2010 Report, supra note 21 at 70.
167 Ibid at 70 and Saskatchewan 2005 Report, supra note 17 at 66.
determine appropriate enforcement proceedings and instruct the enforcement officer 
accordingly. Moreover, an undertaking or security must still be provided and the 
judgment creditor remains liable for the sheriffs costs incurred in connection with 
the requested enforcement measure.
As a result, if the related provisions of Uniform Act or the Saskatchewan Act 
are enacted in New Brunswick, the current dysfunctional creditor-driven system will 
remain in place. A completely new approach is therefore recommended. Although all 
reformed judgment enforcement systems, as well as the Uniform Act, provide that 
the judgment creditor not only initiate but control, contribute to and remain involved 
in the process, it has been previously recommended that, with the exception of 
initiating the enforcement proceeding, the creditor’s detailed involvement should be 
optional. To fill this void, the NBJEA should institute an enforcement office to 
coordinate and supervise all enforcement activities in the province. This office 
should be given broad discretionary powers in order to tailor enforcement measures 
that meet the requirements of individual situations.168
Under the NBJEA, the enforcement officer’s role and authority should be 
described as follows:
[u]nless otherwise provided in another enactment, an enforcement officer 
has the power and authority to undertake enforcement proceedings [... 
upon the filing of a Notice of Enforcement] with respect to property 
located anywhere in the province/territory without the need for further 
authority from the court.169
Similar to the enforcement instruction under the Uniform Act, the Notice of 
Enforcement required under the NBJEA should contain information fields that will 
call upon the judgment creditor to provide the following types of information to the 
extent that they are known to the judgment creditor: the name and address of the 
judgment creditor, the current address and name as it appears on the judgment of the 
judgment debtor, the existence and amount recoverable on the judgment and the 
desire of the judgment creditor to have the judgment enforced as well as a 
description and location of exigible property of the judgment debtor.170
168 New Brunswick 1985 Report, supra note 25 at 23.
169 Uniform Act, supra note 13, s 41.
170 Ibid, ULCC comment on s 40.
Notwithstanding this wide discretionary power yet respecting the optional 
creditor control principle, the Notice of Enforcement would enable the initiating 
judgment creditor to recommend a specific enforcement strategy. Nevertheless, even 
when specific enforcement instructions have been received by the judgment creditor, 
the NBJEA should provide the enforcement officer with the authority to analyse the 
judgment debtor’s individual situation, as well as the expected enforcement costs, 
and determine the most appropriate and efficient enforcement measure for all parties 
involved — especially in the case of a cooperative judgment debtor. In other words, 
without a court order an instructing judgment creditor will only be able to 
recommend an appropriate course of action to the enforcement officer, rather than 
dictate the proceeding.
Considering the enforcement officer’s expertise, experience and resources, 
it is believed that in most cases the enforcement officer will determine the best 
enforcement strategy to satisfy the amount recoverable. In addition, as is currently 
the case with the Support Enforcement Office, the enforcement officer may have a 
better and more accurate portrait of the judgment debtor’s financial situation than a 
judgment creditor. It is also expected that most unsophisticated creditors or creditors 
with limited resources will rely on the expertise and experience of the enforcement 
office.
The proposed discretion given to the enforcement officer under the NBJEA 
is also recognized by the ULCC’s comment that: “a judgment creditor may give an 
enforcement instruction that instructs the enforcement officer to utilize whatever 
enforcement proceedings are necessary to satisfy the amount recoverable”.171 
However, the mandatory terminology used in the Uniform Act seems to negate this 
possibility. It is therefore recommended that the NBJEA expressly provide that the 
enforcement officer may proceed with any enforcement measure that he or she 
determines to be the most efficient and equitable for all parties involved in the 
circumstances unless the judgment creditor provides another commercially 
reasonable and practicable enforcement alternative pursuant to the judgment 
creditor’s optional participation.
The enforcement officer would, however, be required by the Act to inform 
the judgment creditor of the intended enforcement measure and, if a judgment 
creditor’s appropriate and valid enforcement instructions were declined by the 
enforcement officer, the judgment creditor could then apply to the court for an order 
directing the enforcement officer to undertake a specific enforcement proceeding.172
171 Ibid.
172 Ibid, s 6, ULCC comment on section 40; Saskatchewan Act, supra note 12, s 30(2Xb).
Given the expertise developed within a central co-ordinated office, the 
accuracy and accessibility o f updated information on judgment debtors and the 
enforcement officer’s wide discretion to implement the most efficient and effective 
enforcement strategy, it is recommended that the current requirement to provide an 
undertaking or security for costs prior to enforcement be eliminated. The NBJEA 
would follow the current practice in Newfoundland where there is no obligation to 
provide security prior to enforcement. The NBJEA should nevertheless authorize the 
enforcement officer to request security for costs in the event that the only 
enforcement strategy possible represents elevated risks that proceeds may not cover 
enforcement costs. The enforcement officer must evaluate the financial risks as well 
as the interests of the judgment creditors, the judgment debtor and affected third 
parties. However, in order to protect the judgment debtor, enforcement costs and fees 
should be prescribed by regulation and judgment creditors could only recover from 
the judgment debtor the prescribed amount unless ordered otherwise.
The remaining elements o f enforcement initiation proposed in the Uniform 
Act should be incorporated into the NBJEA. These elements include: reporting by the 
enforcement office to the judgment creditor; protection of the judgment creditor from 
any liability arising from the enforcement proceedings; required renewal of the 
enforcement instructions after 24 months; and the continued obligation o f the 
judgment creditor to provide the enforcement office with any new information or 
developments affecting the parties.173
4.2.4 Obtaining disclosure
Sadly, debtors often refuse to disclose their financial situation and their assets.174 As 
a result, enforcement measures to obtain disclosure are essential tools for the 
judgment creditor and the enforcement officer in deciding whether to undertake 
further enforcement measures. In order to choose the most effective remedy, an 
enforcement officer, or a judgment creditor providing enforcement instructions, must 
first determine whether the debtor has any exigible assets that can be seized. It is also 
important to discover whether the debtor has transferred any assets and, if so, to 
whom. In the event a debtor has transferred assets, it may be necessary to initiate 
additional court proceedings in order to have the transfer or assignment declared 
fraudulent.175
173 Saskatchewan Act, supra note 12, ss 32, 35 and 35; Uniform Act, supra note 13, s 42.
174 Alberta 2004 Report, supra note 26 at para 284.
175 Saskatchewan 2010 Report, supra note 21 at 18. See: Assignments and Preferences Act, supra note 20.
Measures compelling disclosure must be incorporated in the NBJEA, 
whether in the Act itself or in the form of a regulation. This recommendation is 
supported by the Alberta Law Reform Institute, which examined in 2004 the 
province’s rules of procedure and determined that the debtor examination rules 
should be included either in the judgment enforcement legislation or in its 
regulations.176 As a result, several regulations of the Alberta Act deal specifically 
with debtor disclosure.177
Nevertheless, how to obtain this information remains a challenge. Judgment 
creditors have essentially four sources of information available to them in order to 
gather information on the debtor.178 First, the judgment creditor may have personal 
knowledge of the debtor’s financial affairs. Second, a search could be performed in 
the public registries. The remaining two options involve the examination of the 
judgment debtor or a third party. Although the first option is outside the formal 
structure of a system of enforcement, the last three sources of information are 
essential to an effective judgment enforcement system and must be included in the 
NBJEA.
Without the judgment debtor’s cooperation, public registries form one of the 
best sources of information. It is therefore recommended that the NBJEA provide the 
enforcement officer the same authority given to the Director pursuant to the Support 
Enforcement Act179. Pursuant to this Act, the Director can demand information from 
anyone about a payer’s location, contact information, salary, employment, assets, or 
any other information that is considered necessary to enforce the order.
Furthermore, it is recommended that the NBJEA adopt an approach similar 
to that found in the Newfoundland Act, which allows the judgment creditor to choose 
the disclosure remedy more suited to the circumstances rather than compelling the 
creditor to follow mandatory steps, as is the case under the Saskatchewan Act. Such a 
model as the latter appears inflexible and would create additional delays and 
expenses for the creditor. The proposed system would thus have the flexibility 
required to promote efficiency and limit enforcement costs for the benefit of all 
parties involved.
176 Alberta 2004 Report, supra note 26, at xiv-xv.
177 Civil Enforcement Regulation, Alta Reg 276/1995 [Civil Enforcement Regulation].
178 New Brunswick 1985 Report, supra note 25 at 87-88.
179 Support Enforcement Act, supra note 124, s 12(3).
Even though an examination might be necessary in certain circumstances, 
this method entails added costs and time for all parties involved. As such, a 
questionnaire has been suggested as an intermediate step. Although it has been 
embraced in other jurisdictions, there is no consensus in New Brunswick on the use 
of this additional method for determining a debtor’s financial affairs. Initially 
rejected by the New Brunswick 1976 Report, the use of a questionnaire was 
recommended in 1985180 and rejected again in 1994 when a voluntary written 
questionnaire was proposed instead.181
According to the Alberta 1991 Report, the proposed questionnaire raises 
several problems, including the likelihood that debtors would ignore such a 
questionnaire or that the information provided by the debtor would be incomplete. 
Creating a standardised questionnaire that covers every situation is either impossible 
or is likely to be too complicated for a great number of debtors. In sum, the 
questionnaire could be just as frustrating as the present system of forcing a debtor to 
attend an examination. Nevertheless, the benefits of questionnaires are recognized: 
they would eliminate the need for oral examination in the majority of cases; 
information would be acquired more quickly; and information obtained by 
questionnaire would be easier to share with creditors than examination transcripts, 
which are expensive, voluminous and may be difficult to acquire.182
Given these important advantages, governments in Saskatchewan, 
Newfoundland and Alberta, as well as the Uniform Act, all contemplate the use of 
questionnaires or financial reports as initial measures to obtain judgment debtor 
disclosure.183 Moreover, New Brunswick has also adopted the use of a financial 
statement in the Support Enforcement Act as prescribed by regulation.184
A questionnaire represents the opportunity for the judgment debtor to 
cooperate and to offer up full disclosure in order to avoid an oral examination.185 
With this information the enforcement officer and the judgment creditors can then 
decide not only whether enforcement actions are justified but which enforcement 
strategy would be the most effective for all interested parties.186 If necessary, an
180 New Brunswick 1985 Report, supra note 25 at 89.
181 New Brunswick 1994 Report, supra note 8, vol 2 at Sum Rpt 31.
182 Alberta 1991 Report, supra note 15, vol 1 at 59.
183 Saskatchewan Act, supra, note 12, Part III, starting at s 11 ; Newfoundland Act, supra, note 10, Part IV, 
s 64ff; Civil Enforcement Regulation, supra note 177, Part 1.3; Uniform Act, supra note 13, Part 8, s 45ff.
184 Support Enforcement Act, supra note 124, s 30(1).
185 New Brunswick 1994 Report, supra note 8, vol 2 at Sum Rpt 31.
186Alberta 1991 Report, supra note 15 at 60.
enforcement officer or a judgment creditor should be allowed to ask for further 
information or particulars from a person having completed a questionnaire.187 
Supplemental instructions could be available online — via Service New Brunswick’s 
website, for example — to help with the completion of the form. The adoption of 
these modifications would undoubtedly improve the efficiency of the system. 88
The Nova Scotia discussion paper acknowledges that, absent a mandatory 
mechanism, a judgment debtor may delay payment of the judgment without penalty 
other than interest, forcing the creditor to take some action at his or her expense.1 9 
The paper proposes some form of ‘wakeup call,’ at little or no cost to the creditor, 
which would trigger payment by the debtor, such as service of a questionnaire as 
proposed under paragraph 45(l)(a) of the Uniform Act. The debtor would then have 
ten (10) days to return the questionnaire, failing which the ‘wakeup call’ would be at 
minimum a visit from the enforcement officer, with possible enforcement action to 
follow.190
Given the increased role of the new enforcement office advocated as the 
foundation of the NBJEA, it is recommended that New Brunswick adopt this 
approach. Upon the filing of a Notice of Enforcement, the enforcement officer would 
serve a financial disclosure questionnaire on the debtor, or any person that has 
information concerning the property of the judgment debtor, which must then be 
completed and returned. Respecting optional creditor control over enforcement 
proceedings, the NBJEA should also permit a judgment creditor to serve the 
judgment debtor with the questionnaire and require that it be completed and returned 
to the enforcement officer.
In simple and straightforward situations, all of the disclosure tools are not 
necessary and judgment creditors should be able to obtain sufficient information 
through the use of questionnaires. In more difficult scenarios, an examination would 
be possible to supplement information obtained through the questionnaire or to 
compel the debtor to answer questions if the questionnaire has been ignored or 
cannot address the complexity of the situation. As such, the NBJEA should provide 
that the enforcement officer or a judgment creditor could compel the judgment 
debtor to attend an examination under oath before the enforcement officer. Unless
187 New Brunswick 1994 Report, supra note 8, vol 2 at Sum Rpt 32.
m Ibid.
189 Nova Scotia 2011 Report, supra note 7 at 32.
190 Ibid.
requested and paid for by the judgment creditor, no transcript would be available 
following the examination.
Unlike the Uniform Act, which requires a judgment creditor to apply for an 
order compelling third parties to provide information known about the judgment 
debtor’s financial affairs191, the authors recommend that this authority devolve to the 
enforcement officer, as is the case in Newfoundland.192 As a result, any person that 
has information concerning property of the judgment debtor, including an employee 
of the judgment debtor, or, if the debtor is a corporation, the directors, officers and 
employees of a corporation, may be required to submit to an examination before the 
enforcement officer.193
Further enforcement measures must be contemplated and judgment debtors 
forewarned that penalties and other consequences are possible in the event a 
judgment debtor refuses to cooperate and honestly disclose the required information. 
Subsection 122(1) of the Saskatchewan Act provides that every person who 
contravenes certain statutory obligations (such as disclosure requirements) is guilty 
of a summary conviction offence and faces a maximum fine of $1,500 for a first 
offence and $10,000 for a second or subsequent offence. Corporations face a 
maximum fine of $10,000 for a first offence and $100,000 for a second or 
subsequent offence. Strong consideration should be given to adopting the same 
approach under the NBJEA. Such a feature would be consistent with the approach 
taken in the New Brunswick Support Enforcement Act, which provides that 
disobedience o f its provisions is an offence punishable under the Provincial Offences 
Procedure Act.194 Finally, in the most difficult circumstances, the court could lend 
assistance by issuing any necessary order, including for contempt.
5. Enforcement procedures and remedies 
5.1 The current law in New Brunswick
Seizure and sale o f property is largely governed by the Memorials and Executions 
Act. The Act allows the seizure of money and securities for money, the seizure of
191 Uniform Act, supra note 13, ss 45(l)(c)-(d); Saskatchewan Act, supra note 12, s 15(1).
192 Newfoundland Act, supra note 10, ss 65-66.
193 Civil Enforcement Regulation, supra note 177, ss 35.09-35.18.
194 Support Enforcement Act, supra note 124, ss 52(1), 56(3) and 56(5).
land and various interests in land, such as a beneficiary interest through a trust or a 
mortgagee’s interest, as well as tangible and intangible personal property.195 If the 
judgment debtor is believed to have exigible property, an Order for Seizure and Sale 
can be obtained from the clerk of the court pursuant to Rule 61. The Order is then 
delivered to the sheriff and has the effect of directing the sheriff to enforce a 
judgment creditor’s claim against the judgment debtor. According to subsection 4(1), 
the judgment debtor’s property is seized by the sheriff to such extent as is necessary 
and feasible to satisfy the Orders of Seizure and Sale received from registered 
judgment creditors and, in some cases, the interest of other creditors such as 
preferred creditors or secured creditors if they possess a higher encumbrance on the 
property.
The enforcement of the Order for Seizure and Sale and other enforcement 
orders is the responsibility of the sheriff,196 although creditors can and often must 
play an important role in gathering information for the sheriff regarding the 
judgment debtor’s exigible assets and providing detailed enforcement instructions. In 
addition, the sheriff may require the creditor to pay the required fees and reasonably 
anticipated expenses o f carrying out the enforcement in advance.197
If there are reasonable grounds to believe that property of the debtor is in 
the possession or control of a third party, that person may be directed to deliver over 
the property.198 However, where property is claimed by a third party, the sheriff may 
refuse to proceed with a seizure until the creditor provides sufficient security to 
cover any damages that the sheriff might sustain because of the seizure or sale.199
A judgment creditor can also attach debts owed to the judgment debtor by a 
third party, and compel the third party to pay the money owed towards the 
satisfaction of the judgment.200 Although the “seizure” of money is technically 
possible under the Memorials and Executions Act, as funds could conceivably be in 
the debtor’s possession, the seizure of income is mostly achieved through
195 Memorials and Executions Act, supra note 20, ss 26(1) (securities for money include cheques, bills of 
exchange, promissory notes, bonds and specialties), 11, 12,23(1), 24(1) (tangible property, i.e., goods and 
chattels), 23.1-23.7 (securities and security entitlements).
196 See Rules of Court, supra note 20, r 61 generally, but also the Memorials and Executions Act and the 
Garnishee Act, supra note 20.
197 Sheriffs Act, RSNB 1973, c S-8, s 13.
198 Rules o f Court, supra note 20, r 61.08(4)
199 Ibid.T 61.08(3).
200 The Garnishee Act, supra note 20, does not apply to all debts, but only to those debts which are “due 
absolutely and without depending on any contingency”. See especially s 32(b).
garnishment, a process by which the judgment creditor can compel a third party to 
remit money which that third party is legally required to pay to the judgment debtor. 
Although the effect of the attaching order is ultimately felt by the judgment debtor, 
the order itself is against the third party, compelling the latter to pay the judgment 
creditor any money owed by the third party to the judgment debtor. Pursuant to an 
attaching order, debts and sums of money owing from the third party to the judgment 
debtor are attached and bound in his or her hands.201 However, not all debts can be 
attached, but only those debts which are “due absolutely and without depending on 
any contingency”.202 If the garnishee makes any payment to anyone other than the 
judgment creditor or into court once served with an attaching order, the payment is 
void and the garnishee is liable to pay the same to the extent of the judgment 
creditor’s claim or to the extent of the debt or sum of money owing by the garnishee 
to the judgment debtor.203
In addition, the Creditors Relief Act provides that the sheriff may garnish 
sums owed to the judgment debtor.204 However, it appears that the sheriff will only 
do so where there are “several executions and claims” in his hands and that there 
does not appear to be sufficient exigible assets to cover all claims as well as 
enforcement costs. Furthermore, the Creditors Relief Act provides that a judgment 
creditor who attaches a debt is deemed to have done so for the benefit of all creditors 
entitled to the pro rata sharing under that Act.205
Another enforcement proceeding currently available to judgment creditors is 
the payment order. Pursuant to section 29.1 of the Arrest and Examinations Act, a 
judgment creditor may serve on the judgment debtor a Notice of Judgment in the 
form prescribed by regulation. The judgment debtor may then either satisfy the 
judgment in whole by paying the amount in the notice received or pay the judgment 
in equal monthly instalments in accordance with the payment schedule prescribed by 
regulation. Under the regulation, the debtor is directed to pay the creditor in 12, 24, 
36 or 48 equal monthly instalments depending on the amount of the judgment.206 If 
the judgment debtor is unable to comply with the prescribed instalments, an 
application may be made to the clerk of the court to vary the prescribed schedule.
201 Ibid, s 5.
202 Ibid, s 32(b).
203 Ibid, s 6.
204 Creditors Relief Act, supra note 18, s 35.
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206 Recovery of Judgment Regulation, NB Reg 84-23, s 4, Schedule A.
Pursuant to sections 29.2 and 29.4, the judgment creditor also has the ability 
to ask the clerk to vary the prescribed schedule and if the judgment debtor fails to 
pay the judgment or the instalments stated in the notice he has received, the 
judgment creditor may apply to the clerk to obtain an order directing the judgment 
debtor to pay. Again, if the judgment debtor cannot comply, he may apply to the 
clerk of the court to vary that payment order. Although failure to comply with any of 
the clerk’s payment orders may be punished by a finding of contempt of court, this 
enforcement measure is rarely, if ever, utilized by creditors.207 The complexity o f the 
legislation governing creditors and debtors alike, the frequent and casual disregard of 
these orders by judgment debtors, the lack of consequences on the recalcitrant 
judgment debtor and the refusal of the justice system to uphold these types of 
payment orders may explain this avoidance.
As stated earlier, section 45 of the Arrest and Examinations Act also allows 
a judgment creditor to obtain an order compelling the judgment debtor to be 
examined under oath. If such an examination has shown that the judgment debtor has 
the ability to pay, an order that the debtor pay the amount of the judgment debt 
together with any costs of examination forthwith or by instalments may also be 
made. Such orders can also be varied on application by the judgment debtor and 
disobedience is punishable by a finding of contempt of court.
Where the judgment creditor can show that enforcement remedies are 
unavailable or unduly complex as a result o f impediments, he or she can apply for 
the appointment of a receiver. This equitable relief is governed by Rule 41.02(l)b) of 
the Rules of Court and entails the appointment of a receiver over specific property. 
Equitable execution is a means of reaching assets that are not otherwise exigible. 
There must be a legal right of the creditor to be paid out of the particular asset that 
the creditor cannot reach without aid of the equitable jurisdiction of the court, but the 
moving party must demonstrate that is it "just or convenient to do so". Accordingly, 
a receiver will not be appointed where it is wholly unnecessary and unless there is 
clear evidence that some benefit will be derived from the appointment of the 
receiver.
Generally, the court will appoint a receiver when garnishment is 
impractical, when the debtor has sheltered assets and when the debtor has arranged 
his or her affairs in such a way that ordinary means o f execution are rendered 
useless. Although this remedy can be very effective, it is rarely utilized — no doubt in 
light of the additional cost that it entails — but arguably because the remedy appears
207 Arrest and Examinations Act, supra note 20, s 29.5.
to be available only when ordinary enforcement measures have failed or would 
clearly be ineffective.208
Upon completion o f enforcement procedures and disposition of assets, the 
issue then becomes how to distribute both the proceeds of enforcement and the funds 
received by the enforcement officer directly from the judgment debtor or third 
parties. Once priority is established between groups of encumbrance holders, funds 
are parceled out according to the principles of distribution expressed in the Creditors 
Relief Act.
Distribution of proceeds among judgment creditors is contingent on the 
requirement that the sheriff “levy” money upon an execution against the property of 
a debtor,209 a notion dependent upon the actual seizure of property and any moneys 
received as a result, whether by disposition or directly from the judgment debtor 
prior to the sale either by compulsion or negotiation.210 Accordingly, any money 
received from the debtor prior to seizure, even when resulting from the threat of an 
impending seizure, or by third parties on behalf of the debtor, is not considered a 
levy and therefore is not distributable among judgment creditors.211 Section 19 of the 
Creditors Relief Act provides, however, that if any money is received from the 
judgment debtor prior to the sale of any seized property and no other creditor has 
filed a claim with the sheriff, the sheriff may pay the enforcing creditor without any 
public notice to other creditors.
According to subsection 4(1), when the sheriff levies funds in excess of 
seven hundred and fifty dollars, he must proceed to make an entry into ajournai for 
public inspection. The sheriff must then hold the distributable fund for a period of 
one month during which additional creditors have an opportunity to file their Notice 
of Judgment or request a certificate under the act in order to share in the proceeds.212 
Finally, all judgment creditors who have filed a Notice of Judgment under subsection 
2.2(1) are entitled to participate in the proceeds of distribution in addition to non­
judgment creditors, who have obtained certificates under the Creditors Relief A ct?13
208 There is little case law in New Brunswick on the appointment of receivers.
209Creditors Relief Act, supra note 18, s 4(1). The French version of the Act states: “Lorsqu’il perçoit une 
somme d’argent”.
210 Dunlop, supra note 19 at 557-59.
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212 Creditors Relief Act, supra note 18, ss 4(1), 9(2).
213 Under the present system, non-judgment creditors may obtain certificates through a summary 
procedure which allows for sharing o f distribution proceeds or, alternatively, provides the certificate 
holder with the opportunity to take out his or her own writ against debtor property which is enforceable on 
its own terms. Williamson states, however, that the procedure is “rarely used, [and] that it is quite
In cases where there is sufficient property to satisfy all judgments, the issue 
of distribution and priorities becomes a moot point. However, as is often the case, the 
eligible property of a judgment debtor rarely allows for sufficient funds to pay all of 
the debts owed to judgment creditors and other encumbrance holders. In cases of 
insufficient amounts being realized by sheriffs, enforcement proceeds are applied 
first against the costs of execution and then shared, proportionally between judgment 
creditors.214
Currently the regime in New Brunswick is most problematic in that the 
legislation on distribution excludes various assets of the debtor including payment 
orders, proceeds of equitable execution such a receivership and, most notably, 
payments made by debtors to judgment creditors prior to seizure.215 In addition, the 
law remains uncertain whether all proceeds from garnishment obtained by a 
judgment creditor are for the benefit of the creditors entitled to pro rata sharing under 
the Creditors Relief Act, as suggested by subsection 35(3) of that Act, or whether 
such proceeds are only shared where the two preconditions of the sheriffs right to 
apply for an attaching order.216
5 2  The case for reform and recommendations
As with the Uniform Act and the Saskatchewan Act, the objective of the NBJEA is to 
provide a modem, comprehensive system of powers and responsibilities for the 
enforcement officer, spelling out the enforcement officer’s authority to deal with a 
variety o f complex assets that are not explicitly covered by our existing judgment 
enforcement legislation. Although promotion of creditors’ rights to successfully and 
efficiently enforce a judgment is a core objective of the reform, it must not be 
attained at the expense of debtors’ rights.
With regards to enforcement remedies, the authors recommend that the 
NBJEA follow the same general principles of the Saskatchewan Act and the Uniform
restricted under present legislation and that in some cases it does not save costs because it will result in 
full scale legal proceedings only in a different form”. See New Brunswick 1985 Report, supra note 25 at 
324
214 Creditors Relief Act, supra note 18, ss 3,23.
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216 See also Creditors Relief Act, supra note 18, s 35(1): the sheriff may apply for an attaching order only 
where (1) there are in his hands “several executions and claims” and (2) “there are not, or do not appear to 
be, sufficient lands or goods to pay all and his own fees”.
Act. Both Acts clarify the role of the enforcement officer, his or her powers and 
responsibilities and provide wide discretionary powers to realize the objectives o f the 
NBJEA and efficiently recover outstanding amounts owing to judgment creditors 
while at the same time protecting judgment debtor interests.
For the most part these Acts contain straightforward seizure and sale 
provisions, including protections for the debtor similar to those under the PPSA 
(redemption of seized property within a certain time, limits on seizable assets to only 
that necessary to cover outstanding judgments, refund of surplus to the debtor, etc.), 
but also contain various provisions for the seizure and disposition of specific types of 
assets, such as licenses, corporate securities and property subject to family court 
exclusive possession orders.
5.2.1 Power of enforcement officer
In contrast with the current creditor-control enforcement remedies, the central role of 
the sheriffs in the proposed judgment enforcement system must be further clarified. 
Unlike the sheriffs current role within the judgment enforcement system, the NBJEA 
should expressly provide a non-exhaustive list of such powers, including the powers 
of election and of a beneficiary under a trust as well as the power to assign or 
transfer an interest in property; to give a release or discharge; to collect an account; 
to present an instrument or security for payment and receive payment; to sue any 
person liable on an account, instrument or security in the name of the judgment 
debtor; to negotiate an instrument or security; and to take protective or conservatory 
measures such as effecting a registration relating to the judgment debtor’s interest in 
the registry, the land titles registry or any other public registry.217
The power to seize and realize upon the judgment debtor’s property, as well 
as the above ancillary powers, are subject to the exigibility of the property and the 
amount of recovery required to satisfy the eligible claims. Hence, an enforcement 
officer may only seize exigible property sufficient to satisfy the amount owing with 
respect to any or all Notices of Enforcement as well as any amount payable to a 
person whose interest in or claim to exigible property or its proceeds has priority 
over an enforcement charge relating to a Notice of Enforcement.218
In addition, when the enforcement officer serves a Notice of Seizure, he or 
she may also serve directions, which may be amended or revoked, respecting the 
manner in which the person served shall or shall not deal with the property while it
217 Saskatchewan Act, supra note 12, s 38(1). See also Saskatchewan 2010 Report, supra note 21 at 73.
218 Saskatchewan Act, supra note 12, s 39.
remains in their possession or control, or requiring the person served to deliver 
possession or control of the property to the enforcement officer. As a result, when 
property has been seized by the enforcement officer, the judgment debtor or other 
person affected can only deal with the property to the extent permitted by the 
enforcement officer. Statutory obligations may therefore be imposed on the person in 
possession of the judgment debtor’s property, “including the obligation to hold or to 
surrender to the sheriff property of the debtor or property to which the debtor is 
entitled immediately or at some future time”.219 A person who fails to comply with 
the enforcement officer’s directions, and anyone who assists that person, is liable to 
the judgment creditor for any loss this causes as well as any penalties contemplated 
by the Act.
5.2.2 Seizure of property
For the purpose of enforcing a judgment, an enforcement officer may seize any 
property of the judgment debtor that is subject to an enforcement charge. According 
to the principle of universal exigibility of the judgment debtor’s property, the 
enforcement officer should be authorized to seize all types of property in order to sell 
it or, conceivably, realize its value in some other way. “Property” should therefore 
be defined in broad terms as (a) land, (b) personal property as defined in the PPSA 
and (c) any other right, claim, interest or thing that has realizable value.
With respect to seizure of property, the NBJEA should adopt the Uniform 
Act and the Saskatchewan Act's notion of “seizure”,220 a term to encompass all 
judgment enforcement remedies provided by prior law. Pursuant to this legal 
innovation, “seizure” can be done in two ways, either (a) by taking physical 
possession of the property, or (b) by serving a Notice of Seizure on whoever has 
control of the property. Except as otherwise specifically provided in the NBJEA,221 
an enforcement officer may therefore seize exigible tangible property either by 
taking physical possession of the property or by serving a notice, as prescribed, on 
the person in possession of the property or the land on which the property is situated 
and posting the Notice of Seizure on the property or in a conspicuous place in close 
proximity to the property.222
219 Saskatchewan 2010 Report, supra note 21 at 73.
220 Saskatchewan Act, supra note 12, s 2(l)(ww).
221 See e.g. ibid, Part VI; Uniform Act, supra note 13, Part 9. These legislative provisions provide specific 
rules applicable to the various forms of, and interests in, personal property, such as: goods, fixtures, crops, 
leases and contracts, securities and security entitlements, intellectual property and accounts. In addition, 
the enforcement officer would possess the discretion to take any other steps as may be appropriate having 
regard to the nature of the property.
222 Uniform Act, supra note 13, s 52; Saskatchewan Act, supra note 12, s 41.
In the case of intangible property, such as goods, chattel paper, a document 
of title, an instrument, money, a security, a futures contract, a licence or an account, 
the seizure would be accomplished by serving notice on the judgment debtor or by 
serving notice on the person whose obligation consists of the property or a portion of 
the property.223 In addition, the Saskatchewan Act permits steps other than those 
described in the Act as may be appropriate to the nature of the property.224 As a 
result, intangible property will always have to be seized by Notice of Seizure, but a 
Notice of Seizure can also be used for physical property if  the enforcement officer 
wants to seize the property but leave it in the physical possession of the judgment 
debtor or another person.
As Cuming observed, these new provisions give a much greater significance 
to seizure by simple notice than was recognized by prior law, since:
[sjeizure by notice is the functional equivalent of seizure by taking 
possession or control in that it gives rise to obligations on the part of the 
person to whom the Notice of Seizure is given to recognize the control of 
the sheriff with respect to the property.225
Cuming further commented on “a very important innovation” in the Saskatchewan 
Act, which he described as:
the possibility of enforcement through seizure of a judgment debtor’s 
interest [in] tangible personal property even though the judgment debtor 
does not have a right to possession of the property. Under prior law, a 
sheriff could not seize property owned by the judgment debtor under a 
writ of execution if to do so was to interfere with the possessory rights of a 
third party. This rule precluded execution against valuable property 
interests since the only method of effecting execution was for the sheriff to 
take possession or control of the property. Under the EMJA, seizure can 
be effected by a notice without physical seizure. Consequently, it need not 
involve interference with the rights of the person in possession of the 
property. This feature is particularly significant where the judgment debtor 
has title to property subject to the possessory rights of a lessee or buyer or 
where the property is a security interest in property of a person who is not 
the judgment debtor.226
223 Uniform Act, supra note 13, s 52; Saskatchewan Act, supra note 12, s 41.
224 Saskatchewan Act, Ibid, s 41 (2)(g).
225 Saskatchewan 2010 Report, supra note 21 at 79.
226 Ibid at 85 [citation and footnote omitted]. See e.g.: Kinnear v Kinnear (1924), 26 OWN 111 (Ont SC).
5.23 Seizure of accounts owing to judgment debtor
As the FSOS of New Brunswick can most likely attest to, the best source o f funds to 
satisfy a debt is the debtor’s flow of future income. As a result, and given the 
previous recommendation that wages and income receive only limited protection 
against civil enforcement measures under the NBJEA, a key element of the proposed 
enforcement system is an expanded and streamlined procedure for seizure of surplus 
employment and other income or any other type of existing or future accounts owed 
to the judgment debtor. To attain this objective, the Uniform Act eliminates 
“garnishment” from judgment enforcement terminology, as does the Saskatchewan 
Act, replacing this enforcement remedy by the seizure of “accounts owing to the 
judgment debtor”227 or seizure of “existing and future accounts”2 8. The 
Newfoundland Act and the Alberta Act both retain the term garnishment, as does the 
proposed 1994 NBJEA.
As with all types of property, the notion of “seizure” should apply to all 
types o f accounts owing to a judgment debtor. It is therefore recommended that the 
NBJEA follow the Saskatchewan Act, which provides, as the title o f Part VII 
clarifies, that seizure can be affected on present and future accounts and 
encompasses any monetary obligation due to the judgment debtor. As explained by 
Wickett:
[t]his includes insurance contracts, letters of credit, guarantee contracts, 
and indemnity contracts. It also includes accounts which are not in 
existence when the Notice of Seizure is served, but which come into 
existence within one year of delivery. This "all encompassing" feature of 
the seizure of present and future accounts provides clarity and flexibility 
that are significantly lacking under the current system.229
With respect to the seizure of income, it is recommended that the NBJEA 
adopt an approach similar to that found in the proposed 1994 NBJEA. This approach 
allows the enforcement officer to determine the exempt assets and income and to 
issue to the debtor an order to pay any surplus income over the assessed amount of 
exempted income. The instalment order would therefore create a personal duty on 
the debtor to pay the enforcement officer a portion of the income received.
227 Uniform Act, supra note 13 at Part 9 -  Enforcement Proceedings Against Personal Property, Division 4.
228 Saskatchewan Act, supra note 12 at Part VII.
229 Amanda CC Wickett, “Goodbye Garnishment: A Legislative Note on Saskatchewan's Proposed 
Approach to the Seizure of Present and Future Accounts ” (2007) 70 Sask L Rev 183 at para 23; 
Saskatchewan 2005 Report, supra note 17 at 112-13; Saskatchewan Act, supra note 12 at Part VII.
Consultation with the judgment debtor on the specific amount payable should be 
envisioned, thereby ensuring the ultimate order reflect not only the debtor’s 
individual situation but the debtor’s wish to increase the proposed payment in order 
to satisfy the judgment earlier. Failure by the judgment debtor to respect the payment 
order would allow the enforcement officer to seize the income directly from the 
source without having to apply for a court order.230
FSOS’s success in garnishing employment income should provide a starting 
point in determining the infrastructure required to seize this type of property and the 
Support Enforcement Act and its regulations templates to be adapted for the NBJEA. 
As under the Support Enforcement Act, protection for the judgment debtor and the 
garnishee are recommended.231 Moreover, it is also recommended that the legislative 
provisions of the Support Enforcement Act and the NBJEA should comprise similar 
terminology and procedures. Although certain differences are expected given the 
nature of support orders and agreements, the administrative structure, procedures and 
documentation should be comparable from a judgment debtor’s and a garnishee’s 
perspective.
5 2A  Disposition of seized property
Consistent with the guiding principle that judgment creditor involvement should be 
an option, but not a requirement; the enforcement officer’s wide discretionary 
powers should naturally be extended to the method of sale of seized property. The 
authors therefore recommend that the NBJEA afford enforcement officers the 
necessary discretion to dispose of seized property in the manner that the enforcement 
officer, acting reasonably, considers offers the best opportunity to maximize the 
proceeds that may be anticipated from disposition. The enforcement officer should, 
however, be required to inform judgment creditors who stand to share in the 
proceeds of the sale as to the method of sale chosen prior to the sale proceeding.232 A 
judgment creditor disagreeing with the enforcement officer’s indented course of 
conduct could then take steps to obtain a court order directing the officer to proceed 
otherwise.233
The preferred approach to implement the above recommendation is found in 
the Saskatchewan Act. Although particular manners o f disposition for various types 
of property or circumstances may be prescribed, subsection 98(1) provides that
230 NBJEA 1994, supra note 66, ss 136, 166.3-166.4.
231 Support Enforcement Act, supra note 124, s 17.
232 Effectively a blend of NBJEA 1994, supra note 66, s 83(2) and Uniform Act, supra note 13, s 64(1).
233 See especially Uniform Act, ibid, s 64(which provides judgment creditors such a right).
seized property shall be disposed of by the sheriff in a manner that is likely to realize 
the maximum proceeds reasonably recoverable under the circumstances, including 
by sale or lease. Cuming advanced the following arguments in favour of granting the 
discretion and resulting flexibility to the enforcement officer:
It reflects the conclusion that detailed requirements imposed on the sheriff 
are more likely to be counterproductive since they may preclude the 
sheriff from taking advantage of market conditions. For example, the 
sheriff may conclude that a sale of real property by a real estate agent or a 
sale of personal property without incurring the costs and delay of 
advertising is the manner of disposition most likely to bring the maximum 
proceeds reasonably recoverable in the circumstances. While this 
approach removes the “safe harbour” provided by statutory rules detailing 
the steps to be taken when disposing of collateral, in the great bulk of 
cases it is likely to be the most efficient way to obtain the maximum 
realizable value of the property.234
This discretionary power is restricted, however, by the Notice of Disposition 
requirement to all interested parties and the enforcement officer’s statutory standard 
o f conduct “to perform a function or duty or exercise a right or power [... ] in good 
faith and in a commercially reasonable manner”.235
The enforcement officer is further guided by the court’s authority to order 
that property be disposed of for any price obtainable if the sheriff is unable to 
dispose of the property for an amount that the sheriff believes is a reasonable price, 
or even prohibit disposition if:
(i) it is unlikely that a disposition will produce sufficient proceeds to 
discharge the costs of obtaining the judgment and the costs of 
enforcement; (ii) the property produces income or is likely to produce 
income that can be applied to satisfy the amount recoverable; or (iii) for 
any other reason the court concludes that the disposition should not
The Saskatchewan Act further provides that a purchaser of the property 
would receive the same title as the judgment debtor possesses. In particular, a person 
who acquires an interest in property in good faith pursuant to a disposition by the
234 Saskatchewan 2010 Report, supra note 21 at 134.
235 Saskatchewan Act, supra note 12, s 115.
236 Ibid, s 98(2).
sheriff takes the property free from the interest of the judgment debtor, an interest 
subordinate to that of the judgment debtor, any enforcement charge affecting the 
property as well as an interest in personal property or in land subordinate to an 
enforcement charge as provided in the Saskatchewan Act or in The Land Titles Act, 
2000.237 The advantages of the aforementioned statutory provisions are summarized 
by Williamson:
there will be no requirement that the Enforcement Officer disclose that the 
property is being sold as a result of enforcement proceedings. This 
approach treats the sale as if it were the debtor doing indirectly what he or 
she should have done directly; sell the property to satisfy the judgments.
This approach should increase the amount realized from the debtor’s 
property.238
5 2 5  Sale of land
The NBJEA should specifically address the sale of land as a means of judgment 
enforcement. The present requirement that all exigible personal property be sold 
before enforcement against land can take place should be removed. Notwithstanding 
the removal of this limitation, the sale of land will remain, in most cases, a method of 
enforcement not to be taken lightly, as the associated enforcement costs and 
likelihood of competing interests will inevitably remain and reduce the actual 
potential of the land to satisfy the judgment debt. In addition, the sale of land would 
be subject to the exemption for equity in a principle residence as previously 
recommended by the authors.
It is further recommended that all joint tenancies be automatically severed 
by operation of the enforcement proceedings under of the NBJEA and that the joint 
owners be deemed to own equal shares in the land. The NBJEA should also provide 
an innocent co-owner the right to apply to court and rebut the presumption of equal 
ownership. The co-owner would have the right to purchase the judgment debtor’s 
share at fair market value before a sale is made by the sheriff, as is provided for in 
the Uniform Act.239
In order to protect judgment debtor and third party interests in land, a 
waiting period before land can be sold to satisfy a judgment debt should be 
prescribed by the NBJEA. The waiting period would allow a judgment debtor the 
opportunity to satisfy the judgment or come to an agreement with the enforcement
237 Ibid, s 103(2).
238 New Brunswick 1994 Report, supra note 8, vol 1 at 14.
239 Uniform Act, supra note 13, s 144(1). See also Saskatchewan Act, supra note 12, s 49(5).
officer or the judgment creditor to avoid the sale of land. Waiting periods of different 
lengths have been adopted in those provinces that have reformed their judgment 
enforcement laws. The Saskatchewan Act provides that interest in land cannot be 
sold before 12 months after the date of seizure240 whereas the Alberta Act provides 
seized land cannot be offered for sale until 180 days have elapsed since the judgment 
debtor has been served with documents advising of the intention to sell land to 
satisfy a judgment.241 In comparison, the Newfoundland Act provides that the sheriff 
cannot offer land for sale until 30 days have elapsed from the date on which the 
judgment debtor was served with notice that land would be sold, and cannot actually 
sell land until 90 days have elapsed since the date of service.242
It is believed that a waiting period of six months should be sufficient for a 
judgment debtor to attempt to rearrange his or her affairs and satisfy the judgment or 
come to an agreement with his creditors so as to avoid the sale of land.243 Finally, the 
NBJEA should enable the court to shorten or extend the waiting period on application 
of an interested party.
52.6 Appointment of receivers
Although Rule 41.02 allows receivership in aid of judgment enforcement, there is 
merit in making this enforcement remedy a part of the NBJEA with codification and 
simplification of the principles governing the exercise of the court’s discretion to 
grant this remedy. The need for the remedy is diminished under a modem judgment 
enforcement statute, which adopts the principle o f universal exigibility, but can still 
play a vital role in judgment enforcement, because circumstances may make 
enforcement more efficient through receivership than through ordinary enforcement 
measures. It is therefore recommended that the NBJEA adopt in substance Part 13 of 
the Uniform Act, making receivership an efficient and effective enforcement tool 
where the circumstances warrant it. It provides that the court may appoint a receiver 
over all or specified property of the judgment debtor. Courts ought to be allowed 
ample discretion as to the scope of any receivership order so as to prevent repeated 
appearances if problems are encountered.
The receiver could thus be appointed over all exigible property, subject only 
to property expressly exempted by the Act. The NBJEA would also provide those
240 Saskatchewan Act, ibid, s 104.
241 Alberta Act, supra note 11, s 72(1).
242 Newfoundland Act, supra note 10, s 105(2).
243 New Brunswick 1994 Report, supra note 8, vol 1 at 13.
circumstances to be assessed by the courts in deciding whether a receiver should be 
appointed. Under the Uniform Act, these considerations include whether receivership 
is an effective means o f realizing on the property, the practicability o f other 
enforcement proceedings, whether the money that a receiver may reasonably be 
expected to realize is likely to be sufficient to pay the costs related to the 
receivership, whether actual money is expected to remain for distribution among 
judgment creditors and whether the receivership may cause undue hardship or 
prejudice to the judgment debtor, a dependant of the judgment debtor or to a person 
in possession or control of property of the judgment debtor.244
The adoption of the Uniform Act provisions also makes it clear that 
receivership is not available only when all other methods of enforcement have failed 
or are clearly impractical, but rather when it is just and convenient to order the 
receivership in light of the previously enumerated circumstances.
The NBJEA should also give the court discretion to grant the receiver those 
powers that are necessary to carry out his or her mandate, but would also provide a 
non-exhaustive list of powers that the court could grant, similar to what is currently 
found at Rule 41.05(d) of the Rules o f Court.
52.1 Distribution of proceeds of seized property
The current complexity of the distribution scheme is the resulting legacy of the 
Creditors Relief Act, due not only to the mandated procedures but in the wording of 
the Act itself. The adoption of personal property securities and land titles legislation 
further complicated the already disenfranchised legal roadmap to resolving priorities 
and distribution for judgment creditors. In response to these obstacles, and guided by 
the principles o f an efficient and coherent enforcement system consolidated under 
one statute, modem judgment enforcement legislation provides a complete code for 
distribution o f a distributable fund to eligible claimants. 45
Although these statutes are conceptually based on the repealed Creditors 
Relief legislation, they provide a much more refined and effective judgment 
enforcement system.246 A centralized “distributable fund” administered and directed 
by an enforcement officer provides benefits for all judgment creditors regardless of 
the level of sophistication or experience. Moreover, it provides for a system where
244 Uniform Act, supra note 13, s 172.
245 Ibid, s 184; Saskatchewan Act, supra note 12, s 110; Alberta Act, supra note 11, s 99; Newfoundland 
Act, supra note 10, s 154.
246 Saskatchewan 2010 Report, supra note 21 at 141. See also: Robinson, supra note 44 at paras 8-14.
access to funding for legal representation does not provide a barrier or benefit to 
recovering funds. This will result in less expense, as well as more timely and 
efficient access to judgment enforcement remedies.247
According to Williamson, one of the significant problems with the current 
legislative structure is its scope and the fact that “it is not broad enough from the 
standpoint of ensuring that the exigible property o f a debtor is distributed pro rata 
among those creditors entitled to share.” 48 Of particular concern is the question of 
the exclusions of various types of property that are not currently seizable by the 
sheriff. This flaw of the current Creditors Relief Act is explained by Buckwold and 
Cuming:
One of the problems with The Creditors ’ R elief Act is the arbitrariness of  
its scope of application. It applies only if money has been levied by the 
sheriff against property of the judgment debtor. Since a levy occurs only 
when the sheriff receives money as a result o f the seizure of a judgment 
debtor’s property (whether or not there has been a sale), payments made to 
the sheriff before a seizure has occurred, payments made by the judgment 
debtor directly to the judgment creditor and payments made to the sheriff 
or judgment creditor by someone other than the judgment debtor are not 
distributable under the Act.249
To address many of these problems, the time of creation of the distributable 
fund and its composition must first be examined. A review of new judgment 
enforcement legislation establishes that the creation of a distributable fund is 
“constituted” when an enforcement officer actually receives money either in the form 
of a payment from the judgment debtor or third parties or in the form of proceeds 
from the disposition of seized property by the enforcement officer or a secured 
creditor.250 For example, subsection 180(1) of the Uniform Act provides that a 
“distributable fund is constituted when an enforcement officer receives money 
toward satisfaction of a judgment in respect of which the enforcement officer has 
received a subsisting enforcement instruction”.
This finding then leads the analysis to the composition of the distributable 
fund which merits particular attention. Given the guiding principles of collective
247 Saskatchewan 2010 Report, supra note 21 at 141.
248 New Brunswick 1985 Report, supra note 25 at 313.
249 Saskatchewan 2005 Report, supra note 17 at 177-78.
250 Saskatchewan Act, supra note 12, s 107; Alberta Act, supra note 11, s 97; Newfoundland Act, supra 
note 10, s 151(1).
enforcement and universal exigibility o f the judgment debtor’s property, the authors 
recommend that the NBJEA follow the New Brunswick 1976 and 1985 Reports 
which recommend that a distributable fund should include any receipt of money by 
the enforcement officer towards satisfaction of an enforcement, whether as a result of 
seizure, garnishment, voluntary payments or otherwise.251
These recommendations take shape in the form of clause 180(2)(a) of the 
Uniform Act, which defines a distributable fund as comprising all money that is 
“received by an enforcement officer towards satisfaction of a judgment after the 
receipt of an enforcement instruction regardless of the source of the money [...] 
whether or not the money is received as a result of an enforcement proceeding in 
respect of a judgment debtor’s property”.252 Likewise, the Saskatchewan Act has cast 
a wide net in formulating its definition of a distributable fund which captures all 
“[mjoney received by the sheriff in relation to an enforcement charge, whether or not 
the money is received as a result of an enforcement measure, with respect to the 
judgment debtor’s property”.253
Both the Uniform Act and the Saskatchewan Act contain language 
surrounding the creation of a “distribution fund” which charts new territory as it 
relates to the collection, administration and distribution of funds. However, both 
Acts fall short in fully addressing the issue o f money paid voluntarily by judgment 
debtors to judgment creditors and direct that only fimds received “after giving an 
enforcement instruction” be included in the distributable fund. In particular, the 
Saskatchewan Act provides at subsection 170(3) that:
a judgment creditor who receives any [...] payments after giving an 
enforcement instruction to the sheriff shall deliver any funds received to 
the sheriff, regardless of whether the enforcement instruction is a 
subsisting enforcement instruction at the time payment is received.254
Cuming explains the policy reason behind the decision to authorize a judgment 
creditor to retain a payment from the judgment debtor before filing a Notice of 
Enforcement and yet require the same creditor to remit such payment once a notice is 
delivered to the enforcement officer as follows:
251 New Brunswick 1976 Report, supra note 9 at 32.
252 Uniform Act, supra note 13, s 180(2Xa).
253 Saskatchewan Act, supra note 12, s 107(2)(a).
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Clause 107(3)(a) is based on the policy conclusion that, once a judgment 
creditor has elected to invoke the judgment enforcement system by 
delivering an enforcement instruction, he or she cannot circumvent the 
system by retaining money paid directly to him or her by the judgment 
debtor or someone else. However, a judgment creditor who has not 
invoked the system, other than to register his or her judgment, is entitled 
to deal directly with the judgment debtor in seeking satisfaction of the 
judgment.255
The inapplicability of judgment enforcement legislation prior to the receipt 
o f a Notice of Enforcement from each and every registered judgment creditor seems, 
however, to defeat not only the principles of collective enforcement and of pro rata 
distribution among eligible creditors but also of the universal exigibility of the 
judgment debtor’s property for all judgment creditors. Under those Acts, it would be 
“possible for a judgment creditor who has received payment of part of his or her 
judgment under circumstances in which the money need not be remitted to the sheriff 
[ ...] to thereafter deliver an enforcement instruction and share with other judgment 
creditors in distribution of a fund”.256
In the New Brunswick 1985 Report, Williamson notes that the underlying 
reason for allowing payments from debtors to judgment creditors outside o f the 
scope of a distributable fund was to encourage negotiation between the parties and 
payments outside the enforcement system. He argues that this is inconsistent with the 
pro-rata sharing approach and that all voluntary payments should be remitted to the 
enforcement officer.257 Allowing payments that are clearly outside of the scope of 
the distributable fund not only allows, subject to the Assignment and Preferences 
Act25*, but encourages unjust preferences.259 In agreement with these conclusions, it 
is therefore recommended that the NBJEA deviate from the limited application of the 
Saskatchewan Act and the Uniform Act and provide that any money received by 
registered judgment creditors must be reported to the enforcement officer and be 
considered as forfeited to the enforcement officer for inclusion in a distributable 
fund. The NBJEA should therefore adopt the aforementioned all-encompassing 
definitions of “distributable fund” but enlarge its scope to include not only moneys 
received following the delivery of a Notice of Enforcement to the enforcement 
officer but rather following the filing of a Notice o f Judgment in the PPSA Registry 
for the benefit of all judgement creditors.
255 Saskatchewan 2010 Report, supra note 21 at 143-44.
256 Ibid.
257 New Brunswick 1985 Report, supra note 25 at 317-319.
258 Assignments and Preferences Act, supra note 20.
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Once the composition o f the distributable fund is determined, the NBJEA 
must prescribe which creditors can claim priority and which judgment creditors are 
eligible to share in the distributable fund. According to the Newfoundland Act, only a 
registered judgment creditor “at the time the distributable fund is constituted and no 
other person has an eligible claim to that distributable fund”.260 In comparison, 
sections 179 and 182 of the Uniform Act limit the access of a distributable fund to 
instructing judgment creditors, and all eligible claims are determined by the 
enforcement officer as of the time the distributable fund is constituted when an 
enforcement officer receives money after receipt of an enforcement instruction. 
However, as observed by the ULCC comment on this provision:
[b]etween the time of a seizure by an enforcement officer and the time 
that the enforcement officer receives proceeds from the sale or other 
disposition of the seized property, additional judgment creditors may 
deliver enforcement instructions to the enforcement officer and thereby 
become eligible claimants who are entitled to share in the distribution of 
the distributable fund under this Part.261
Between these two options lies the Saskatchewan Act. Although that Act 
provides that only instructing judgment creditors are entitled to share in proceeds of 
enforcement proceedings, a sheriff must serve on any registered judgment creditor in 
the registry and who has not given an enforcement instruction to the sheriff a notice 
of the upcoming distribution of the fund in accordance with the period prescribed at 
section 108.262 This notice affords registered judgment creditors the opportunity to 
provide the sheriff with enforcement instructions that will enable them to participate 
in the distribution. The 1994 NBJEA also provided a 30-day period to registered 
judgment creditors to declare their desire to share in the proceeds.263
It would seem, however, that by limiting access to the distributable fund to 
judgment creditors whom have already given instructions to the enforcement officer, 
as is proposed by the Uniform Act, the priority given via registration to a judgment 
creditor above other subsequent charges on the judgment debtor’s property would be 
in fact nullified. Accordingly, notice to all registered judgment creditors is 
recommended to enable all exigible claims to participate in the distribution. In order 
to determine de ‘exigibility’ of claims, it is further recommended that the NBJEA
260 Newfoundland Act, supra note 10, s 153(1).
261 British Columbia 2005 Report, supra note 2 at 237-8.
262 Saskatchewan Act, supra note 12, s 109.
263 NBJEA 1994, supra note 66, ss 169-170.
adopt section 183 of the Uniform Act authorizing the enforcement officer to demand 
information about a claim from judgment creditors.
These recommendations do not resolve, however, the uncertainty regarding 
the total amount of eligible claims to be enforced prior to enforcement. With this 
objective in mind, an effective enforcement strategy based on the actual amount of 
eligible claims could be achieved by requiring the enforcement officer to provide 
notice o f the upcoming enforcement to all registered judgment creditors prior to 
enforcement proceedings. In reply to the enforcement officer’s notice, registered 
judgment creditors would be permitted to file a Notice of Enforcement in accordance 
with the statutory requirements of the NBJEA, prior to the initiation of enforcement 
proceedings in order to share in the distributable fund. Any creditor omitting to reply 
to the enforcement officer’s request or indicating a refusal to participate within the 
prescribed period would not be entitled to participate in the distribution. As a result, 
only judgment creditors that have filed a Notice of Enforcement would be eligible to 
participate in the distribution and share a distributable fund.
If the distributable fund is constituted by the receipt of money that does not 
result from an enforcement proceeding such as a payment from the judgment debtor 
or the realization of a security interest, a similar notice to registered judgment 
creditors could be envisioned. In the event of the receipt of a regular stream of funds, 
such as the seizure of surplus income, additional registered judgment creditors would 
be able to share in the distributable fund and the enforcement officer, upon receipt of 
any additional Notices of Enforcement, would determine whether a new enforcement 
strategy is warranted. In the event a revised strategy is recommended by the 
enforcement officer, notice must be given once again to all registered judgment 
creditors prior to the actual enforcement. This option still provides a sense of fairness 
to all registered judgment creditors like the Saskatchewan Act and the Newfoundland 
Act while enabling the enforcement officer to develop the most efficient and 
effective enforcement strategy for all enforcing judgment creditors prior to 
enforcement.
With regards to distribution, both the British Columbia 2005 Report and the 
Nova Scotia 2011 Report recommended substantial adoption of the distribution 
scheme and list of eligible claims provided by the Uniform Act. Language adopted 
by the Saskatchewan Act is substantially different, although a careful reading would 
suggest that the order of distribution and the conceptual charges are very similar in 
nature.264 Under the Uniform Act, all judgment creditors who have filed enforcement 
instructions are eligible to participate in the proceeds of the “distributable fund”.
264 See also the Newfoundland Act, supra note 10, s 154(1); Alberta Act, supra note 11, ss 99-100.
According to subsection 184(1), eligible claims are identified and paid out as 
follows:
1) Fees, taxable court costs and expenses of the enforcement officer earned or 
incurred in connection with the enforcement proceedings that relate to the 
money comprising the distributable fund, which amount must be paid to the 
enforcement officer or to the judgment creditor or other person to the extent that 
such fees, costs or expenses have been paid to the enforcement officer;
2) Taxable court costs of a judgment creditor incurred in a proceeding to obtain a 
preservation order, a third person or interpleader proceeding, or any other 
application to the court attributed to money in the distributable fund;
3) Exempt income or proceeds of disposition from the sale of property of exempt 
property of the judgment debtor to the judgment debtor;
4) The eligible claim of each instructing judgment creditor whose enforcement 
instruction led directly to the contribution of money to the distributable fund up 
to a prescribed amount;265
5) Eligible claims that by virtue o f any other enactment or law in force are entitled 
to priority over the claims of judgment creditors generally;
6) Eligible claims o f judgment creditors paid on a pro rata basis who were parties 
to an interpleader proceeding to the extent that money in the distributable fund 
can be attributed to those proceedings;
7) Taxable costs not falling within 1), 2) or 3), that are payable out of the 
distributable fund under a court order;
8) The remaining balance in the distributable fund is distributed on a pro rata basis 
among
i) judgment creditors to the extent of remaining balance of their eligible 
claims,
ii) landlords, if at the time of seizure, they had a right of distress under landlord 
and tenant legislation; and
265 Uniform Act, supra note 13, s 184(lXd). Section 184(lXd) provides that the instructing judgment 
creditor’s claim cannot exceed the lesser of (i) the sum of $2000 plus 15% of the amount by which the 
remaining balance of the distributable fund exceeds $15 000, or (ii) the amount of money in the 
distributable fund that is directly attributable to the enforcement proceeding of that instructing judgment 
creditor;
9) Any amount remaining must be paid to the judgment debtor or person entitled to 
it unless, prior to payment to the judgment debtor, the enforcement officer 
receives a new enforcement instruction.
The aforementioned categories make up the list of eligible claims to the 
distributable fund under the Uniform Act. The functioning of the scheme is such that 
one category must be exhausted prior to distribution to the next category. Therefore 
all claims referenced in the first category must be paid out o f the proceeds o f the 
distributable fund prior to payment o f eligible claims in the second category, and so 
forth.
Notwithstanding the procedural and substantive novelties proposed for the 
NBJEA, a similar scheme for the priority of exigible claims remains appropriate for 
the NBJEA with the omission of the third and fourth category. It is unclear why a 
judgment debtor’s exempt income or proceeds of disposition from the sale of the 
judgment debtor’s exempt property be included in the distributable fund if there are 
“exempt”. In fact, none of the modem judgment enforcement legislation includes 
such a category.266
In addition, the NBJEA does not require that any preference be given to 
judgment creditors whose enforcement instructions have led directly to the 
contribution of money to the distributable fund.267 Guided by the principle of 
optional judgment creditor control, and in the absence of any requirement to provide 
specific instructions or security for costs, the NBJEA does not task any judgment 
creditors with liability in terms of evaluating the enforcement options, or with 
making key decisions on enforcement measures. As a result, the “free rider problem” 
in other jurisdictions, where only some of the judgment creditors expend the effort 
and incur the risks associated with enforcement proceedings, would not occur under 
the NBJEA.268 The reward given to instructing judgment creditors under the other 
Acts is therefore neither required nor recommended under the NBJEA.
Nevertheless, judgment creditors do have the option under the NBJEA to 
control the enforcement process and should not be penalized for their diligence and 
successful enforcement on behalf o f all enforcement charges. As a result, their fees,
266 See Saskatchewan Act, supra note 12, s 109; Newfoundland Act, supra note 10, s 154(1); Alberta Act, 
supra note 11, s 99.
267 For e.g.: Uniform Act, supra note 13, s 184(lXd) : preference to judgment creditors is limited to $2,000 
plus 15% of the remainder of the fund exceeding $15,000 or such other sum as set by Regulation.
268 Saskatchewan 2010 Report, supra note 21 at 149.
costs and expenses should be prioritized to the same extent as those of the 
enforcement officer. These enforcement costs would be fixed and assessed by the 
enforcement officer, as is currently the case by the court or the clerk of the court.
The interplay between categories 5 and 8 creates the possibility that security 
interests, which are perfected by registration, are interspersed by date and time of 
registration among enforcement charges. Lawyers and academics alike have taken 
issue with the percentage of distribution in the case of intervening secured creditors 
ranking among judgment creditors under the auspices of equity and application of 
the NBJEA. The fact that judgment creditors who register their judgments after a 
secured interest are “allowed” to benefit from a priority created by the earlier 
registration by another judgment creditor does raise some form of unfairness. This is 
well illustrated in the following example offered by Walsh to explain priority among 
registered judgment creditors where there is an intervening registered security:
Suppose, for instance, that Judgment Creditor A registers a judgment 
against Debtor for $10,000. Secured Party subsequently takes and registers 
a security interest against all Debtor’s present and after-acquired personal 
property to secure a $20,000 loan. Judgment Creditors B and C then 
register their judgments. In this scenario, Creditor A has priority over 
Secured Party to the extent of $10,000. But because the security interest is 
perfected by the time that Creditors B and C enter the picture, Secured 
Creditor has priority over them to the extent of the $20,000 secured loan. 
Nonetheless, Creditors B and C, by virtue of their sharing rights under the 
Creditors Relief Act are entitled to share pro rata in Creditor A’s $10,000 
priority over Secured Party.269
For Creditor A in Walsh’s example, having to share the $10,000 priority he 
or she diligently secured with two other judgment creditors is disconcerting, 
especially if Creditors B and C have substantially higher judgments. Creditor A may 
indeed receive the lowest portion of the funds available to the class he created, while 
the intervening Secured Party retains priority for the next $20,000 available from 
Debtor. This effectively creates a scenario where the first registered creditor may end 
up getting less money than all other creditors who have registered subsequently.
As such, some have advocated that the common law “first come, first serve” 
system that preceded creditors’ relief legislation was fairer. While such a system 
certainly would be “fairer” to Creditor A in Walsh’s scenario, the system can create 
other unfairness. For example, Creditor A may have easily obtained a default 
judgment because Debtor neglected or was unable to defend his claim. Meanwhile, 
Creditors B and C may have initiated legal action long before Creditor A, but were
269 Walsh, supra note 102 at 112.
not able to obtain a quick judgment, either because Debtor defended those claim or 
because their claims were not for liquidated damages, which denied them the ability 
to obtain a default judgment and forced them to conduct a trial on damages, all of 
which necessarily require more time.270 In such circumstances, Creditor A may be 
“first in time” only because of the particular circumstances that prevailed. It can also 
be argued that a first in time system inevitably favours creditors with greater 
financial means who can react more rapidly and secure the necessary legal services 
to obtain a judgment as quickly as feasible over those less fortunate creditors who, 
although diligent, may not be able to act with the same dispatch.
Others argue that the relatively good position of Secured Party in Walsh’s 
example is also unfair. Indeed, current law allows Secured Party to establish a 
second ranking to all future judgment creditors to the extent of the $10,000 judgment 
value registered by Creditor A. While Secured Creditor afforded credit to Debtor 
with full knowledge of the outstanding judgment, he may have also acted with full 
knowledge of the pending, yet un-adjudicated, claims of Creditor B and C, claims 
which may have been for substantial sums bom of long existing obligations. 
However, the authors would argue that any system creating a priority for all 
undeclared judgment creditors without any cap would thwart economic activity that 
is dependent on the accessibility of credit.
It would appear that the modem approach to dealing with two sets of 
interests on property is to provide for a reconciliation of both interests to the possible 
detriment of judgment creditors. While it may be argued that this treatment is an 
erosion of the rights of judgment creditors, it may also be argued that it is simply a 
strict application of the principle guiding the NBJEA that there shall be no priorities 
established between judgment creditors in enforcement legislation.
Finally, once enforcement proceedings are completed and the order of 
distribution determined, the enforcement officer should be required to prepare a 
Notice of Distribution indicating the total amount of the distributable fund and the 
amount received by each eligible claim under the NBJEA. The Notice o f Distribution 
must be served on all interested parties, including the judgment debtor, judgment 
creditors with eligible claims, secured parties, lien holders and other persons with a 
security or registered interest in property affected by enforcement proceedings which 
led directly to the contribution of the distributable fund.271
270 Rules of Court, supra note 20, r 21.04,21.05,21.06.
271 Uniform Act, supra note 13, s 187. See also: Alberta Act, supra note 11, s 99; Newfoundland Act, supra 
note 10, s 154; Saskatchewan Act, supra note 12, s 110.
A statutory grace period for distribution of proceeds should also be 
contemplated to allow the above parties or any other person to object to the 
distribution scheme or aspects of it by giving a Notice of Objection to the 
enforcement officer within a prescribed period.272 Once the period of grace allowed 
for any objections to the distribution scheme has expired and, where the amount of 
the distributable fund exceeds the amount required to make all payments, the funds 
can be distributed accordingly.273 Objections can then be dealt with according to the 
NBJEA.
6 . C o n c l u s io n
In light of political reality, any proposed system of creditor’s remedies 
will have to strike a careful balance between the interest of the creditor 
and that of the debtor. It will have to offer the creditor a real possibility of 
collection while at the same time assuring the debtor that he will not be 
subjected to abuse.274
The NBJEA contemplates a grant o f wide discretionary powers to a new 
enforcement office and its officers with the objective and the hope that the new 
judgment enforcement system will create and maintain equilibrium between 
judgment creditor and debtor rights and interests.
Current law in New Brunswick dealing with judgment execution is in dire 
need of reform. Reports from this province as well as numerous others highlight the 
significant deficiencies and problems with the present system. To date, three 
provinces have taken steps to improve the situation for creditors, debtors and 
practitioners.
As stated at the onset o f this article, the objective was to analyse specific 
issues within New Brunswick’s current legal judgment enforcement regime in 
comparison to other proposed or enacted legislation in Canada in order to determine 
the best solution for the province. It is believed that this article has also provided
272 Uniform Act, supra note 13, s 188; Alberta Act, supra note 11, s 101; Newfoundland Act, supra note 10, 
ss 156,159; Saskatchewan Act, supra note 12, s 111.
273 Uniform Act, supra note 13, s 185; Alberta Act, supra note 11, s 101; Newfoundland Act, supra note 10, 
s 154; Saskatchewan Act, supra note 12, s 108. Exceptions are made pursuant to s 186 of the Uniform Act 
for funds in excess of $2,000 or situations where two or more judgment creditors have claims in excess of 
the distribution fund.
274 New Brunswick 1976 Report, supra note 9 at 239.
additional elements to incite the debate which should take place in the wake of the 
modernization of our provincial judgment enforcement system.
In conclusion, the authors hope that the current government maintains its 
goal to enact a modem NBJEA and that the issues identified in this article and the 
recommendations contained herein will entice and help the province achieve this 
objective.
